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CHAPTER I
Introduction
On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated terror attacks struck Paris, France. Terrorists backed by the
Islamic State perpetrated coordinated suicide bombings and mass shootings at the Stade de France, several
local restaurants and cafes, and the Bataclan theatre. These attacks killed 130 individuals and injured several
hundred, a significant escalation over the January 2015 attacks on the Charlie Hebdo offices and a Jewish
supermarket in Paris that left 17 dead and 22 wounded. France had not seen such casualties on its home
soil since the destruction of World War II. These attacks continued a growing trend of terrorist violence
perpetrated by non-state actors. That evening, President Franc¸ois Hollande chaired an urgent meeting of the
French cabinet in which the government declared the first national state of emergency in France since 1961.
Less than a week later the Parliament extended the initial proclamation for three months, and in the months
that followed the Parliament authorized additional extensions such that the state of emergency is not set to
expire until November 2017.
Under Article 16 of the French Constitution of 1958, “Where the institutions of the Republic, the indepen-
dence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfillment of its international commitments are under
serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is in-
terrupted, the President of the Republic shall take measures required by these circumstances.” This includes
the declaration of a state of emergency. During the 2015-2017 state of emergency the French government
removed several structural limitations that may have significantly increased its ability to respond to threats
both foreign and domestic. However, the French security services and police also conducted previously out-
lawed raids on local mosques and closed a number of businesses belonging to France’s substantial Muslim
population, all with minimal judicial oversight [Safdar, 2016].
This extension of political power to the executive in times of grave crisis is not unique to the French case.
Democratic framers frequently centralize power in the hands of executive during periods of emergency, com-
promising some democratic principles to enhance national security when confronted by a heightened threat
[Rossiter, 1948; Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2004]. From 1800 to 2012, 80 democracies adopted emergency
provisions, formal legal acts that dictate the shifting roles of state actors and institutions during times of
international or domestic crisis.1 The invocation of emergency provisions varies dramatically but can reach
great frequency. While India has declared a state of emergency just three times, the use of Necessity and
Urgency Decrees in Argentina reached an average of 54.5 decrees per year during the presidency of Carlos
1This accounts for over half of all democratic country-years during this time frame.
1
Menem, 36.5 decrees per year during the two years of Fernando de la Rua’s presidency, and 60 decrees per
year under Nestor Kirchner [Capriata, 2008].2 As the occurrence of non-state and civil violence increases,
their invocation will likely rise dramatically, as the cases of France, Belgium (November 2015), and Turkey
(July 2016) show.
These events highlight a long-standing question – how does the delicate balance between security and
democracy shift during times of severe crisis? Answering this question entails first understanding exactly how
and why the state’s domestic institutions change during times of emergency. In this dissertation I significantly
contribute to our ability to do so by providing the first comprehensive overview of emergency provisions in
democratic states. While scholars have examined human rights violations under states of emergency [Hafner-
Burton et al., 2011], scholars have yet to examine how emergencies change the distribution of political power
within the state.
To remedy this, in Chapter 2 I present a systematic data collection on formal rules regarding states of
emergency in democracies. For each provision, I have collected and codified the circumstances in which
states of emergency can be declared, how long they last, the state’s institutional structure during the state
of emergency, and the extent and limitations of the powers granted to the state’s leader to combat the crisis.
Using Bayesian factor analysis, I develop a measure of the latent strength of the power of the executive in
each of these emergency provisions across time.
Using this measure of emergency power strength within democracies, I then explore the origins of these
powers in a systematic fashion. The elements that lead to an expectation of future turmoil, such as a history
of violent political conflict or a looming international threat, increase the likelihood that states adopt stronger
emergency powers. Additionally, states enact stronger emergency provision when they posses elements that
exacerbate a time of emergency, such as institutional or physical features of the state that could increase
grievance or decrease the government’s ability to manage the population during times of crisis.
In Chapter 3, I study the impact of these emergency provisions on the outbreak of violence. Scholars
argue that institutions in democracies constrain leaders and prevent international conflict. However, since
many democracies specify rules of governance in times of emergency that divert substantial power to the
head of state, the manipulation of these emergency powers provides a rational motivation for conflict. Using
a novel dataset of emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between emergency power
strength and conflict propensity taking several steps to achieve causal inference, including an instrumental
variable analysis that exploits the specificity of the state’s constitution as a plausibly exogenous determinant
of emergency power strength. I find that emergency power strength is a strong predictor of conflict onset in
2This variation occurs for two reasons. First, states have varying formal circumstances in which emergency provisions can be
invoked. Second, the events that lead to invocation are not distributed evenly among states. Some states are simply more likely to
encounter international foes, terrorist violence, domestic disturbances, or natural disasters.
2
democracies in each test, and find that states with strong emergency powers are substantially more likely to
enact a state of emergency due to an international conflict.
In Chapter 4, I consider a new type of violence - terrorist violence. Scholars frequently suggest that
institutional constraints on the executive are necessary to prevent overly repressive executive actions that
spur on further terrorist violence. However, few studies consider why an unconstrained executive might
prefer to take such counterproductive action. Following recent work by Dragu & Polborn (2014), I suggest
electoral incentives shape the leader’s choices for how best to conduct counter-terror activity. I draw on
experimental work regarding on individual response to terror to provide additional nuance to this theory,
arguing that the public spurs on overly harsh reprisals for terror attacks that arise from an out-group but that
terror events that arise from the in-group do not inspire such a response. I then test this argument empirically,
using the nation of origin of the attacker to proxy for their social identity, and exploiting my data set on
emergency power strength and data on declared states of emergency to capture within-country variation – in
addition to between country variation – in executive constraints in democracies. I find that when emergency
circumstances remove standard institutional constraints on the leader, the leader takes overly harsh counter
terror measures that inspire further violence in the case of transnational terror but not domestic terror. This
chapter greatly advances our understanding of the role of both democratic constraints and public preferences
in driving or preventing terrorist violence.
The final section concludes with a discussion future avenues of research that will be possible using these
data. These data allow scholars to consider the impact of terrorism on state institutions and human rights, as
the motivating example suggests, as well as the influence of these institutions on the outbreak of international
conflict and terrorist violence. This measure can further be used to assess the impact of emergency pow-
ers on a variety of political phenomena and examine a multitude of fundamental questions of comparative
institutions, domestic political competition, civil unrest, natural disasters and more.
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CHAPTER II
The Content, Causes, and Measurement of Emergency Powers in Democratic States
II.1 Introduction
The state of emergency is a longstanding historical feature of liberal forms of government, dating back at least
to the Roman Republic [Rossiter, 1948]. In recent years, their prominence and use has risen tremendously.
Following the terror attacks on November 13, 2015, the French government declared a state of emergency
that persists to this day, and threatens to become permanent [Serhan, 2017]. On November 21, 2015, the
Belgian government put its capital of Brussels on lockdown, including the closure of shops, schools, public
transportation, music venues, and the cancellation of professional football, under the “serious and imminent”
possibility of an attack by the ringleaders of the Paris attacks [Traynor, 2017]. On July 21, 2016, after a failed
coup against the government, President Erdogan of Turkey declared a temporary state of emergency that
nonetheless remains in place one year later [Kingsley, 2017]. These massive events have shaken the political
landscape in a number of nations, and yet our understanding of the state of emergency remains limited.
Before we can begin to understand the impact of the state’s domestic institutions in times of emergency
on political phenomena, it is vital that we first gain an understanding of how states of emergency can alter
the normal proceedings of the state. That is the purpose of this first chapter, in which I examine emergency
provisions across states and across time in a systematic empirical fashion. In the first section of the chapter,
I present an overview of the data collection procedure. I then discuss the content of emergency provisions,
providing the means of classifying these powers by their scope, depth and conditions, and discuss specific
examples of emergency provisions codified in formal legal documents. The third section of the chapter
explains the method for developing the measure of emergency power strength and displays some descriptive
information about the measure. In the fourth section of the chapter, I explore the characteristics of democratic
states that make emergency provision adoption most likely, as well as the determinants of emergency power
strength, including a closer look at the relationship between peacetime institutions and institutions during
periods of emergency. The final section concludes with a discussion of how this measure can further be used
to assess the impact of emergency powers on a variety of political phenomena.
II.2 Coding Emergency Provisions
I will begin with an overview of the data collection procedure. I examine only democracies, where formal
legal rules have the greatest strength.1 I began with all states coded as a 6 or higher on Polity’s compos-
1In an extension of this project, I will consider the role of emergency provisions in non-democratic states.
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ite Polity2 score for each year from 1800 to 2012, since these states are typically considered democracies
[Marshall and Jaggers, 2001].2 I use Polity scores as the basis for identifying democratic states as they are
the most common measure of domestic political institutions in the literature on democracy, allowing scholars
to meaningfully compare this study to previous work and use this measure in empirical work. Under this
criterion, there are 119 states that were democratic for at least one year in the time frame. I then found the
relevant emergency provisions contained in constitutions, amendments, and legislative acts for each of the
119 states in each year across time,3 including historical constitutions, amendments, and relevant legislation.4
Over time, these provisions have been adopted relatively consistently as the number of democratic states in
the system increases, with a great number of these emergency provisions in place today.
Democratic states formalize the provision of emergency powers through two principal avenues: consti-
tutions and legislation. Constitutions and constitutional amendments are the primary means through which
states grant executive emergency powers, and 70% of democratic constitutions contain provisions for declar-
ing a state of exception. Due to the relative stability of democratic constitutions, constitutional emergency
provisions within democratic states persist for many years.5 States also adopt emergency powers via legisla-
tive statutes.6 States without a formal written constitution commonly adopt legislative emergency provisions,
and some states with formal constitutions nevertheless codify emergency procedures through their legislative
bodies.
Certain democracies that do not have institutional emergency provisions have developed a norm of en-
hanced executive discretion in times of emergency. The predominant example of a country with a convention
of enhanced executive control in times of conflict is the United States. Indeed, scholars argue that the ex-
tension of executive powers during times of war is one of the primary ways through which the Presidency
has gained power over time [Corwin, 1984]. Constitutional and legislative provisions may therefore be in-
dicative of a latent trait in democracies – the centralization of executive power during times of conflict – that
is not always formally institutionalized. However, there is a distinction between democracies with formal
emergency powers and those with informal norms regarding periods of emergency. These formal emergency
provisions set out common understandings of what the government can legally do. Since informal powers
do not have a legal backing, if a leader takes emergency action under the auspices of norms it may provide
a focal point to coordinate domestic opposition to challenge the leader’s actions [Weingast, 1997], even in
2There are two common cutoff points for democracy in the literature – Polity score greater than 6 and Polity score greater than 7. I
err on the side of inclusion and use the broader definition of democracy.
3The Comparative Constitution Project [Elkins et al., 2009] formed the basis of this research, collecting state constitutions in their
most recent iteration. Though the CCP provides some information on state emergency powers, it is not sufficiently comprehensive
regarding shifts in political power for use in data analysis.
4Relevant legislation includes any legislation dictating state behavior in times of international crisis.
5Substantive changes to emergency powers occur in less than 4% of constitutional changes.
6Sixteen emergency provisions in the data come from legislative statutes.
5
times of conflict [Berinsky, 2009].7 This is a fundamental difference between formal emergency powers and
norm-based emergency powers.8 This analysis includes only formal emergency powers and treats states with
de facto powers as states without emergency powers.9
I examined 147 individual constitutions10 and over 500 potentially relevant amendments and legislative
acts for democratic states, finding 172 unique emergency power provisions that comprise the data. Having
compiled a list of relevant formal documents, I developed a coding procedure to categorize them. On the
whole, these categories account for the threshold of use, scope of application, depth of application, and
duration of each provision. I first developed a number of criteria to assess when the government can declare
a formal state of emergency according to each document. This includes first coding whether the democracy
legally provides for a state of exception and what actors or bodies can formally declare the state of emergency.
I then coded a series of indicators of the specific circumstances – such as attack, war, foreign aggression, civil
conflict or upheaval, and natural disaster – under which states may declare a state of emergency.
I then documented changes to the traditional institutional order during a period of emergency. I coded
a series of indicators of the level of formal power diverted to the effective leader in times of emergency.
I use information on the effective leader for each state across time from Archigos [Goemans et al., 2009].
The effective leader denotes the Prime Minister in a parliamentary regime and the President in a presidential
regime or mixed regime.11 These measures of formal power indicate first whether the power to declare an
emergency belongs to the effective leader or some other political actor, or requires consultation between the
leader and outside actors. I then coded whether the effective leader can make use of additional powers in
times of emergency and assessed the nature of these powers, regarding clarity, whether they allow the leader
to take measures outside of a military scope, and whether they grant the ability to make policy declarations.
Lastly, I coded measures that indicate the number of prospective and retrospective checks on this power, as
well as formal limitations on how long emergency powers and policies declared during an emergency may
last. In the following section, I describe the broad takeaway points regarding the content of these provisions
and describe specific examples of emergency provisions.
7In an ongoing study, I examine this difference in an experimental setting.
8States would be no safer under normative powers. If these de facto powers do become so institutionalized within the state that they
comprise formal extensions of executive power such that they hold the same force that legal powers would, leaders would face the same
temptations I describe regarding de jure powers. If they are not so institutionalized, the state may face an emergency and be unable to
respond sufficiently.
9Two points further support this choice. First, it is difficult to comprehensively collect data on convention-based emergency powers.
Second, there is no reason to suspect that this will bias statistical analysis systematically, or in favor of my finding. The United States,
for example, biases results against my theory, with both a high propensity for conflict and low formal emergency powers.
10Of the 4573 country years in the data, 269 come from constitutions not available online and are therefore excluded. This is just 6%
of the data.
11Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza argue that Presidents should be considered effective leaders in regimes that combine presidential
and parliamentary aspects, since “in these regimes, presidents typically control foreign policy” (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza 2009,
272).
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II.3 Emergency Provision Content
Emergency provisions vary across several important dimensions that dictate how the onset of a crisis shapes
the domestic political order. Though they vary dramatically regarding what defines a state of emergency, each
emergency provision highlights the extraordinary nature of the threat to the democratic order or to national
survival. The Serbian Constitution of 2006 allows the declaration of a state of emergency “when the survival
of the state or its citizens is threatened by a public danger (Article 200).” The Paraguayan Constitution of
1992 calls for the declaration of a state of exception in “the case of an armed international conflict, formally
declared or not, or of a grave internal commotion that puts in imminent danger the rule of this Constitution
or the regular functioning of the organs created by it (Article 288).”
Nearly every emergency provision covers an external opponent, while 56% also provide measures to
combat an internal threat. This suggests that while states of emergency are often used to resolve civil matters,
their design heavily reflects the insecurity of the international system. Some leaders can invoke emergency
powers only when under external attack. The Moldovan Constitution of 1994 states, “In the event of armed
aggression against the country, the President of the Republic of Moldova takes the steps required to repel
aggression (Article 87.3).” This is relatively uncommon – only 15% of states restrict the use of emergency
powers to an attack by a foreign opponent. Further, only 50% of states require a formal declaration of war
before the leader can take emergency measures.
In many cases it is not specified what actions short of open warfare warrant the declaration of a state of
emergency. India’s Constitutional Amendment of 1978 states, “A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that
the security of India or any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by
armed rebellion may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or rebellion, if
the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof (Article 37, Amendment of Article 352).” The
threat of conflict can be grounds for a declaration of a state of emergency, even before the opponent takes
military action or before an internal group has struck out in open revolt.
Emergency provisions exhibit a wide range of specificity. Most emergency provisions delineate clear
procedural tools that the executive may utilize in times of crisis. The Honduran Constitution of 1982 states
that the executive may “incur loans, change the purpose of an authorized item, or open additional credits for
satisfying urgent or unforeseen needs in the event of war, internal disturbance or public disaster” (Article
365).” However, in approximately 40% of cases, emergency provisions grant broad and/or vague powers,
often allowing the executive to take whatever measures she deems necessary to prosecute the crisis in ques-
tion. The Taiwanese Constitution of 1994 states that during a period of emergency the President may “take
all necessary measures to avert imminent danger affecting the security of the State or of the people or to cope
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with any serious financial or economic crisis (Article 4),” granting broad powers to combat a broad array of
ills.
There is significant variation in the extent of the leader’s political power during times of emergency. In
roughly 12% of cases, the provision only allows the leader to declare a state of emergency, with no signif-
icant increase in the leader’s power. In a further 12% of cases the leader’s power is purely restrictive – the
leader has the ability to suspend certain rights or civil liberties to combat the threat, but can take no further
action. When emergency provisions do divert power to the leader, said power can face a multitude of restric-
tions and caveats. Under the current Constitution of the Philippines, the President can direct national policy
during a state of emergency, after the Congress has declared an emergency via a two-thirds vote, but only
if the Congress votes to authorize the emergency measures, for a limited period of time, and subject to any
restrictions that the Congress deems necessary (Constitution of the Philippines, 1987, Section 23 Articles
1-2).
However, there are many emergency provisions that dramatically alter the political landscape through
granting the leader broad, sweeping power. In the South Korean Constitution of 1987, the President has
the authority to proclaim martial law and introduce special measures to ensure the public safety without
the consent of the National Assembly, which can lift martial law only retroactively through a majority vote
(Article 77.1-5).12 Often emergency provisions grant the executive the ability to make declarations of policy
that immediately become law. The Slovenian Constitution of 1991 grants the government the ability to
“issue decrees with the force of law (Article 108)” during a state of emergency or war. Nearly 40% of
emergency provisions grant this level of policy power. Further, while in 80% of cases these policies expire
after a set period of time, generally when the emergency itself terminates, only 55% of declared emergencies
automatically end within a specific time frame. Often emergencies can be renewed when exigencies demand
it, which means nations may operate under a state of emergency well past the period of the initial crisis.13
This descriptive overview reveals an important fact about provisions regarding states of emergency in
democratic states – they vary considerably, as these examples demonstrate. We might reasonably expect both
that the source of this variation is significantly impacted by political factors and that this variation may lead
to differential effects of emergency provisions on quantities of interest in political science. This underscores
the importance of understanding exactly what these provisions entail. In the following section, I describe
how these questions might meaningfully be tackled using a measure of emergency power strength that I have
developed to capture this variation.
12In perhaps the most extreme example, the Slovak Republic’s Constitution of 1992, the President is required to dissolve the parliament
in the case of war or an exceptional state, and the parliament ceases to function entirely as a result (Article 102).There is some dispute
over the proper interpretation of this chapter [Khakee, 2010], and it was revised in 2004.
13The case of India following the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, described in greater detail in the next chapter, highlights this fact well.
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II.4 Emergency Power Strength
Although emergency provisions differ dramatically across countries and across time, a number of common
features, as I have described, dictate the executive’s level of political control.14 By analyzing these spe-
cific elements, I develop a measure of the formal political power the effective leader can access during an
emergency, regardless of the level of political consent she has at the time, which I call emergency power
strength.15 To convert these factors into a usable measure for statistical analysis, I use Bayesian factor analy-
sis to derive a measure of latent emergency power strength for each document. In factor analytic models, the
observed measures corresponding to the elements within constitutional provisions are assumed to be intercor-
related because they are driven by the same latent construct.16 Factor analysis provides one way to reproduce
the observed intercorrelation among the indicators using a single latent variable [Brown, 2006]. Bayesian
measurement models have been used previously in political science [Clinton et al., 2004], but rarely in inter-
national relations.17 In Bayesian factor analytic models, the goal is to compute the posterior density over all
unknown parameters in the model conditional on priors and the observable indicators [Jackman, 2009].18
I estimate this Bayesian factor analysis model using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods.19 The pro-
cedure provides a continuous measure of emergency power strength for each emergency power provision
in each year that, as opposed to an additive index, does not depend on an arbitrary determination of how
individual factors relate to the underlying latent strength characteristic.20 The measure of emergency power
strength ranges from -1.02 to 1.64, with a mean centered at 0 and a standard deviation of .97.21
To demonstrate the range of the data visually, I present a graphical depiction of the range of constitu-
tional emergency powers for democratic states for the year 1989 in Figure II.1.22 There are several notable
descriptive takeaways from this slice of the data. The first is that the strongest emergency powers in 1989
are from the Republic of Korea, while the weakest emergency powers are from Japan. This is especially
14The ideal quantity of interest is the difference in potential power in times of conflict as opposed to times of peace. Emergency power
strength provides a noisy measure of this. However, unless the difference between this measure and the ideal measure is correlated with
the error of the following statistical models, the results will not be biased. Further, controlling for peacetime institutions allows me to
make statements about the difference between peacetime power and power in times of emergency.
15The appendix contains a table describing the coding of the specific elements mentioned in the above section that I examine within
emergency provisions.
16There might meaningfully be several sub-dimensions to this strength – threshold of use, scope of application, depth of application,
and duration. However, the features herein align clearly along one dimension, with an Eigenvalue of 5.63, which accounts for 62% of
the variance in the explanatory variables. No other factor accounts for a significantly large portion of the variance.
17I follow one notable example in the literature [Benson and Clinton, 2014].
18I use naive priors. For an in-depth explanation, see Jackman (2009).
19The factor loadings for emergency power strength are contained in the appendix. The minimum criteria for the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
Measure of Sampling Adequacy is .5. Since the KMO for this set of variables is approximately .8, this indicates at least one shared
dimension between the variables.
20I have also created a hand-coded measure of emergency power strength from 0 to 5, based on my own reading of the constitutions
with subsections checked by research assistants. This measure correlates with my factor-derived measure at .92, speaking to the face
validity of the Bayesian measure.
21Centering the mean at zero and constraining the standard deviation to be approximately 1 allows me to identify the model.
22I chose 1989 because of the importance of that year in global politics. I show only constitutional emergency powers in this figure in
order to improve visual clarity.
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noteworthy because the constitution of the Republic of Korea borrowed extensively from the constitution of
Japan. The figure also demonstrates that while some of the states with stronger emergency powers are those
we might otherwise expect to encounter emergency situations quite frequently, such as France or Turkey,
there are a number of relatively small and perhaps unexpected states with strong emergency powers, such
as Trinidad and Tobago and the Dominican Republic. This suggests that it is not simply the international
or domestic environments alone that drive emergency power provision. Similar variation exists at the lower
end of emergency power strength. While this figure depicts constitutional emergency powers for just one
year, it demonstrates that there is significant variation in strength across states that cannot quickly or easily
be dismissed as indicative of alternative state characteristics.
Figure II.1: Constitutional Emergency Power Strength Across Countries: 1989
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Emergency Power Strength in Democracies, 1989
In Figure II.2, I now show a map that includes the range of emergency powers in 2012. It is clear that
the number of states with emergency powers has risen considerably in this time, particularly owing to the
rise of democracy in the post Cold War era, primarily in central and Eastern Europe, and that this increase in
emergency power provision covers the full range of the strength spectrum.
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Figure II.2: Constitutional Emergency Power Strength Across Countries: 2012
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Emergency Power Strength in Democracies, 2012
In Figure II.3, I present the maximum and minimum emergency power strength scores across constitutions
for each democracy in which there is a substantive shift in the strength of the emergency provision. While
the number of instances of substantive shifts is relatively low, these shifts occur across a number of countries,
and many of the shifts themselves are quite dramatic. For example, emergency power strength in Sri Lanka
ranges from -1.02 in 1957 to .97 in 1981, covering a significant portion of the range of emergency power
strength. There are a number of countries with both very high maximum emergency powers and very low
emergency powers across time, and variation at every level of the scale.
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Figure II.3: Constitutional Emergency Power Strength Across Countries
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Minimum and Maximum Emergency Powers
To provide an initial test of the validity of this measure, I test the relationship between emergency power
strength and declared states of emergency from 1970 to 2007 in Table II.1 [Hafner-Burton et al., 2011]. I
expect that states with stronger emergency powers will be more likely to declare a state of emergency since
they may be more likely to encounter emergencies and their leaders have more to gain from invocation.
Consistent with this expectation, states are more likely to declare an emergency when they possess stronger
institutional emergency provisions.23 This provides initial evidence that strong emergency powers are found
in states that most require the protections these powers offer.
23I show the full specification in the appendix.
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Table II.1: States of Emergency and Emergency Powers
(1) (2)
Declared SOE Declared SOE
Emergency Power Strength 0.294∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗
(0.0404) (0.0739)
Constant -0.174 -5.092∗∗∗
(0.159) (1.249)
Observations 1930 995
Controls No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
These powers also vary across democratic political institutions. In Table II.2, I split the data into emer-
gency provisions above and below the mean level of emergency power strength to consider variation in emer-
gency power strength across different types of democratic regimes. I find strong emergency powers make up
a much larger proportion of presidential democracies than other democracies.24 The only substantial differ-
ence in emergency powers across democratic systems is within presidential democracies – strong and weak
emergency powers are found in roughly similar proportions in parliamentary and mixed systems.
Table II.2: Democratic System and Emergency Powers
Presidential Parliamentary Mixed
Below Mean 19 34 17
27.14% 48.57% 24.29%
Above Mean 32 30 14
42.11% 39.47% 18.42%
II.5 The Origins of Emergency Powers
Now that I have described these powers and how they can meaningfully be measured, it is important to con-
sider how these provisions initially arise. Emergency provisions widely vary in terms of the power that states
grant to the executive to combat a period of crisis. In this section, I explore the systematic variation between
countries that helps explain the differences demonstrated across emergency power provisions. Though there
are few direct accounts of the decision to adopt emergency powers, historical accounts of constitution-making
in democracies and considerations of factors that exacerbate emergencies suggest elements that influence the
24Since some data on democratic regime type is missing, these documents are excluded.
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decision to adopt emergency powers and the decision of how strong the executive must be to sufficiently
handle an emergency situation.
States that have experienced a greater number of international conflicts should be likely to adopt strong
emergency powers. This may be because previous conflict between states leads to an expectation of future
conflict, or because a culture of conflict drives both past and future disputes. An historical example is the
French Constitution of 1958. Spurred on by the memory of the hardships of World War I and World War II,
the constitutional framers in France believed that the executive had consistently lacked the power to impose
necessary policies in the face of urgent events [Foyer, 1988]. France’s extraordinary provisions granted strong
powers to the president in times of emergency as a response to their lack of central government authority in
times of war. Past conflict behavior might therefore drive stronger emergency power provision.
Scholars suggest that states facing a looming threat such as an international rival are significantly more
likely to formally grant powers to the executive in times of emergency. Since each conflict in a rivalry makes
future conflict more likely [Colaresi and Thompson, 2002], rivalries lead to the rational expectation of future
disputes, and thus the state supports institutional safeguards to handle the disputes. In the case of the Greek
Constitution of 1975, Greece’s rivalry with Turkey over Cyprus revealed the military elite’s inability to deal
with the national emergency [Tsatsos, 1988]. Framers therefore returned political power to the politicians,
enacting provisions to ensure that their leaders would have the power necessary to prosecute future disputes
with Turkey.
Framers often grant emergency powers when events demonstrate the vulnerability of the nation’s standard
democratic institutions to internal threats. The Venezuelan Constitution of 1961 is heavily influenced by the
nation’s previous experience with autocracy and its long history of coups and military intervention in the
government [Manrique, 1988]. More stable democracies might therefore have lesser need to institutionalize
strong emergency powers. Since democratic constitutions often specify emergency action to battle coup
d’e´tats and civil discord, we should expect that emergency powers will be stronger when states have a history
of domestic conflict.
States that suffer a large economic burden during times of conflict realize the danger an economic down-
turn poses. States may see centralization of political power as a way to combat this danger if they believe their
economy is vulnerable to the possibility of a crisis in the future. When debating the provision of emergency
powers, Venezuela’s past economic and financial difficulties weighed as heavily as its history of domestic
discord. This failure promoted a strong belief that Venezuelan leaders must have the ability to battle the
economic ills driven by periods of crisis [Manrique, 1988]. States with more vulnerable economies may
therefore enact stronger emergency powers. Further, the manner in which the economic burden is born by the
state may also influence the need for emergency powers. Greater economic inequality within a state should
14
be highlighted in times of crisis, which may lead to discord and protest that prompts a desire for a strong
hand from the government [Muller, 1985].
States should be equally concerned about factors that might make future internal discord particularly dan-
gerous. States with larger populations may fear that in the future they will be unable to control the population
in the event of an emergency. States with difficult terrain may be unable to reach their populations in times
of emergency. Further, states that have geographical features that allow internal dissidents to strike and hide
from the state’s police or military apparatus may therefore require the provision of stronger emergency pow-
ers to expand the power of the state’s security forces to gather information and locate these actors [Fearon
and Laitin, 2003].
Each of these factors – conflict expectations, domestic stability, economic security, and territorial features-
might influence the decision that framers make to adopt some level of emergency protections in their consti-
tutions. Likewise, these factors should also be expected to influence the strength of the emergency powers
the state is willing to grant to the leader. In the following section, I test these relationships empirically.
II.6 Empirical Test
To explore the determinants of emergency power provision and emergency power strength, I move to a large-
n analysis. I use two dependent variables. The first is the provision of emergency powers. For this variable,
I code all states that codify formal emergency powers for the executive in times of crisis as 1 and all states
with no formal emergency powers as 0. The second dependent variable is emergency power strength, where
I use the emergency power strength variable as calculated above using Bayesian factor analysis.25
In this exploratory analysis, I include as independent variables the factors that scholars suggest might
prompt leaders to formalize emergency powers and the factors that might require the power granted to the ex-
ecutive in times of conflict to be strong. It is possible that emergency power provision and emergency power
strength are driven by a culture or history of conflict within the state. If states with a previous experience
with conflict expect conflict in the future, these states might rationally institutionalize emergency powers to
guard against this possibility. As a result, I include the count of previous militarized interstate disputes in-
volving the state up to the given year [Sarkees and Wayman, 2010]. States may also adopt emergency powers
when they are confronted with a looming external threat. Since rivals engage in crises in greater numbers
than other states [Goertz and Diehl, 1993; Goertz and Diehl, 1995], rival states may be more vulnerable to
political upheaval from international or domestic sources. I therefore include a measure for the presence of
an interstate rivalry [Thompson and Dreyer, 2011].
25To make a causal claim, if I am interested in explaining the emergence of emergency provisions and the subsequent strength of these
provisions, I can only look at new emergency provisions, which dramatically restricts my sample, making it difficult to estimate a model
that includes multiple independent variables. As a result, I consider this study exploratory, determining what features of democratic
states are associated with emergency power provision and strength.
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The quality of a state’s domestic political institutions likely reflects the probability of the breakdown of
the normal government order. I account for this in two ways. First, I include as a regressor the number
of previous coup d’e´tats that a state has experienced up to the year in question. States that have previous
experiences with coups may have unstable political institutions. Coup data comes from the Coups in the
World Dataset [Powell and Thyne, 2011]. Second, states with stronger democratic institutions may be less
vulnerable to internal or external conflict. As a result, I include each state’s Polity score, as well its square
to account for a possible non-linear relationship, to account for peacetime institutions [Marshall and Jaggers,
2001].
States may also craft emergency power provisions based on their expectations of future financial burdens
or collapse, which may either exacerbate periods of crisis or may themselves be emergencies. To account
for this, I include a measure of the health of the state’s economy, as captured by the democracy’s GDP per
capita [Gleditsch, 2002]. Additionally, I include the state’s level of inequality (Gini coefficient) [World Bank,
2007], to account for the possibility that states believe that horizontal inequalities may be dangerous in times
of crisis, as the masses, disproportionately affected by the emergency, may have increased grievance and the
government and traditional state institutions may be unable to handle this grievance under the strain of the
emergency.
Lastly, I include measures for two features of the state that may make emergencies particularly dangerous.
First, I include the state’s population, since larger populations will be harder to control during times of
emergency, all else equal, and thus might require greater executive control [World Bank, 2007]. Second,
I include the percentage of the state’s terrain that is mountainous [Fearon and Laitin, 2003]. Mountainous
terrain is particularly difficult for governments to control, as this allows opposition groups to operate free
from the reach of the state’s security apparatus, and thus such rocky terrain may require additional leeway for
the state’s security forces to locate and stop dissident groups.
As the dependent variable of emergency power provision is binary, I estimate a logistic regression in the
first model. When I move to study emergency power strength, the dependent variable is continuous, and so
I estimate an ordinary least squares regression. In each test the unit of analysis is the democracy-year. The
analysis covers all emergency provisions from 1950-2012. I present all results using robust standard errors.
To account for temporal trends and duration dependence I include polynomial temporal controls since the
state was last nondemocratic [Carter and Signorino, 2010].
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Table II.3: Determinants of Emergency Powers
(1) (2)
Emergency Power Provision Emergency Power Strength
Past MIDs 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗
(0.00231) (0.000488)
Rivalry 0.399 0.350∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.0671)
Previous Coups 0.382∗∗∗ -0.00256
(0.0767) (0.00641)
Polity Score 1.149 0.936∗∗∗
(1.061) (0.289)
Polity Score (Squared) -0.0977 -0.0690∗∗∗
(0.0644) (0.0177)
Population (Logged) 0.0550 0.00944
(0.0764) (0.0210)
% Mountainous Terrain 0.0175∗∗∗ -0.00165
(0.00677) (0.00141)
GDP Per Capita -0.0514∗∗∗ 0.00509
(0.0194) (0.00586)
Economic Inequality 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0114∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.00334)
Constant -8.211∗ -3.830∗∗∗
(4.498) (1.137)
Observations 1324 1324
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Democracy year splines
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table II.3 demonstrates the results. Model 1 captures the predictors of emergency power provision, while
Model 2 captures the predictors of emergency power strength. Starting with the determinants of emergency
power provision, I find that previous international conflict behavior is a strong predictor of emergency power
provision. Moving from the mean number of previous MIDs to one standard deviation above the mean
increases the predicted probability of emergency power adoption from .65 to .71, a six percentage point or
9% increase. Previous internal conflict is also a strong predictor of emergency power adoption. Shifting from
the mean number of past coups to one standard deviation above the mean increases the predicted probability of
emergency power adoption from .75 to .88, a thirteen percentage point or 17% increase. This is comparatively
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the largest effect on emergency power adoption, showing that even though emergency provisions tend to be
written to combat external threats, perhaps the driving force behind them is internal. Political institutions
in times of peace demonstrate no such relationship, nor does engagement in an interstate rivalry. While the
size of the population does not impact emergency power provision, the ease of insurgent operation does, as
moving from the mean percentage of mountainous terrain to one standard deviation above the mean increases
the predicted probability of emergency power adoption from .70 to .75. For the economic variables, increasing
GDP per capita lowers the probability of emergency power adoption by 5 percentage points, while increasing
economic inequality has the reverse effect, leading to an increase of 12 percentage points in the predicted
probability of emergency power adoption.
Turning to Model 2, there are a number of interesting results regarding the strength of formal emergency
powers. Previous militarized interstate disputes remain a strong predictor of emergency power behavior.
However, while previous coups were the strongest predictor of emergency power adoption, they exhibit no
relationship with emergency power strength. The presence of an external rival, while not fundamental to
the decision to adopt emergency powers, does tend to make emergency powers stronger. While there is a
relationship in this model between peacetime institutions and institutions during periods of emergency, the
relationship is quite weak. This suggests perhaps that emergency behavior is not captured in the standard
measures of democracy. Features of terrain and population size exhibit no relationship with emergency
power strength. Regarding economic factors, the general health of the nation does not impact the strength of
emergency powers. However, more unequal states tend to provide stronger emergency powers.
In sum, the determinants of emergency power provision and emergency power strength are only partially
consistent. A history of internal turmoil predicts emergency power provision, but external conflict expecta-
tions seem to predict the strength of these powers to a much larger degree. Similarly, while factors that may
exacerbate a crisis tend to predict emergency power provision, they have a much reduced effect in predicting
emergency power strength. In the following section, I tackle one particular relationship of interest, between
emergency powers and Polity scores, in greater detail.
II.7 A Deeper Look: Emergency Powers and Polity Scores
To demonstrate why these data are so important, it is useful to explore in greater detail the relationship be-
tween this measure of emergency power strength and the most typical measure of the strength of democratic
institutions in peacetime – Polity scores [Marshall and Jaggers, 2001]. While scholars have recently de-
veloped new measures of democracy that improve on this original conception [Lindberg et al., 2014], this
provides a solid baseline measure of a state’s democratic institutions. Further, Polity scores remain the most
frequently used measure of a state’s relative democratic institutions. Polity defines democracy according to
18
three primary criteria. A democracy must have the institutions and procedures through which citizens can
express their preferences about alternative political policies and leaders, institutionalized constraints on the
exercise of executive power, and must guarantee civil liberties to all citizens in both their lives and in acts of
political participation [Jaggers and Gurr, 1995]. Although Polity scores are designed to measure peacetime
democratic institutions,26 scholars frequently include Polity scores in models of international or domestic
conflict, when emergency provisions are likely to be in effect. This means that the measure is relevant in
comparing institutions in times of peace and in times of crisis. Additionally, since Polity scores primarily
reflect the decisional constraints on the executive [Gleditsch and Ward, 1997], they provide a particularly apt
comparison to a measure of the power diverted to the leader in times of conflict.
When scholars use Polity scores to differentiate between democracies and autocracies in models of con-
flict, their implicit assumption is that the institutions captured in the scores are static with regards to conflict.
I have argued at length that this is not the case. Alternatively, these scholars might expect that states with
stronger democratic institutions – that is, those that are less autocratic in peacetime – would also be more
democratic in times of conflict. In the previous section, I have demonstrated that peace time institutions
do not predict institutions in times of crisis in such a linear fashion. If there is little relationship between
emergency power strength and Polity scores, there is a discrepancy between peacetime constraints on the
effective leader and constraints in times of conflict, and thus these measures are not suitable for studying the
relationship between institutions and conflict.
Figure II.4: Emergency Power Strength and Polity Scores
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26Scholars have discussed the suitability of the measure for this task elsewhere [Bennett, 2006].
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I present a scatterplot of the relationship in Figure II.4, comparing the individual emergency power scores
for each country year to each country’s Polity score in that year. As a reminder, Polity ranges from 6 to 10 in
this study of democratic states, while emergency power strength ranges approximately from -1.02 to 1.64. If
Polity scores capture war-time constraints on the executive, states with lower Polity scores – those considered
to be more autocratic – should be more likely to grant strong emergency powers, resembling the powers of
an autocrat, in times of crisis. Instead, there is almost no relationship between emergency power strength and
strength of democracy as measured by Polity.
Figure II.5: Emergency Power Strength and Polity Scores (Non-Linear)
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If I allow the relationship to take a non-linear form, as in the section determining the causes of emergency
powers, we see that it is states in the middle range of Polity scores that have the strongest emergency powers.
However, the relationship remains quite weak, and it is difficult to assert a relationship exists at all. I show
this result in Figure II.5. This is not the linear relationship that we must accept to use peacetime institutions
as a proxy for institutions during times of crisis. Further, there is substantial variation in emergency power
strength that across all levels of Polity scores. It is important to keep this in mind when using Polity scores
to study international or civil conflict. A measure of emergency institutions should be included in models
of conflict – at least as a supplement to Polity scores – since the institutions differ so dramatically in times
of crisis from times of peace, and these institutions influence the foreign policy or domestic policy decision-
making of the actors in government.
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II.8 Conclusion
This project provides several important contributions to the study of international relations and comparative
politics. The primary contribution is the systematic collection of emergency provisions in democracies across
time. I codify the emergency provisions in the constitutions and legislation of 119 democracies from 1800
to 2012, including all changes or amendments, and measure emergency power strength. Additionally, I
demonstrate how state level factors contribute to the decision to grant emergency powers and how strong
emergency powers must be to handle a time of crisis. All of these data will be made publicly available. These
data provide an important source of comparative institutional variation for democratic states. Further, this
institutional variation may have an impact on any number of foreign or domestic policy outcomes.
This chapter further demonstrates one way in which variation within states that share the same regime
type is as important as between regimes of different types, and thus emphasizes the importance of capturing
these differences in our measures and models. In that regard, this study is connected to other studies of
democratic institutions as well as recent attempts at creating new measures of democracy. Future studies of
regime type must consider institutional structure in a way that moves beyond the traditional separation of
democracy and autocracy.
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II.9 Appendix
Emergency Powers Coding Template
Country: What country is the constitution for?
Constitution Year: What year is the active constitution from?
Passage: The full constitutional passage regarding emergency/crisis/siege/war etc. powers. Included:
War Declaration: How is war declared in the country?
Who: Who gets powers (president, prime minister, other)?
When: In what circumstances are the powers given? How is the emergency/crisis defined? Does it
mention times of war, conflict, foreign aggression etc.? What are the processes for declaring a state of
emergency/crisis? Who can declare a state of emergency? Who must they consult?
What: What powers are given? Is power to affect policy given? What powers are given specifically in
regards to waging war? How broad are the powers? How do they deviate from political processes in normal
times?
Const. Change: Has the relevant passage in the constitution changed since the previous constitution? If so
how?
Effective Head of State: What is the name of the position of the effective head of state?
Strength Subcomponent Coding
(Note: . always = Undefined)
Declaration:
0- Chief executive is not able to declare a time of crisis or emergency
1- Chief executive is able to declare a time of crisis or emergency in consultation with/after consulting other
government actors/must get the declaration approved before it goes into effect.
2- Chief executive is able to declare a time of crisis or emergency without consulting other government actors.
Exception
0- A state of exception cannot be declared (even if war can be)
1- A state of exception can be declared
Breadth of Definition:
0- The definition of a time of war, crisis, or emergency is narrow
1- The definition of a time of war, crisis, or emergency is broad
Civil Emergency
0- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does not specifically include internal disturbance
1- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does include internal disturbance
External Emergency
0- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does not specifically include external disturbance
1- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does include external disturbance
Crisis
0- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does not include crises short of war
1- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does not require war/includes international crises short of
war
Attack
0- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency only includes cases of attack
1- The definition of a time of crisis or emergency does not require armed attack
Powers
0: No additional power is granted to the chief executive in times of war/emergency.
1: The additional power granted to the chief executive in times of war/emergency corresponds only to the
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waging of the war/relates directly to the management of the armed forces.
2: The additional power granted to the chief executive in times of war/emergency does not only correspond
specifically to the waging of the war/relate directly to the management of the armed forces.
Vagueness
0- The alteration of the balance of power/powers granted to the executive are clear
1- The alteration of the balance of power/powers granted to the executive are vague
Domestic:
0- The powers granted to the executive do not include an explicit reference to domestic powers
1- The powers granted to the executive include an explicit reference to domestic powers
Policy: 0- Chief executive is not able to make policy declarations with the force of law.
1- Chief executive is able to make policy declarations with the force of law only after consulting with the
other branches of government or other actors can repeal them.
2- Chief executive is able to make policy declarations with the force of law without consulting with the other
branches of government.
Policy Expiration: .- n/a, chief executive is not able to make policy declarations.
0-The policies enacted by the executive may automatically expire after some pre-determined amount of time
(such as when the period of emergency ends) or they must be approved or they will expire.
1-The policies enacted by the executive do not automatically expire after some pre-determined amount of
time.
Emergency Expiration
0-The state of emergency automatically expires after some pre-determined amount of time or automatically
expires unless approved by another body.
1- The state of emergency automatically does not automatically expire after some pre-determined amount of
time or is renewable.
Secondary Actor
0- The emergency powers are granted (in whole or in significant part) to the head of state
1- The emergency powers are granted (in whole or in significant part) to an actor who is not the head of state
-88- The emergency powers are granted (in whole or in significant part) to a purely ceremonial actor (i.e.:
monarch)
Extra-Constitutional
0- The states emergency powers do not derive from a source of legislation outside of the formal constitution
1- The states emergency powers derive from a legislative source outside of the formal constitution
-88- The states emergency powers derive from a legislative source outside of the formal constitution because
there is no formal constitution
Rating Change
1- Rating change from one (democratic) country year to the next
68- Rating change from previous democratic constitution after period of non-democracy but with no non-
democratic constitution ever enacted
78- Rating change from previous democratic constitution after period of non-democracy with a nondemo-
cratic constitution in between 98- Rating change from previous, unknown democratic constitution
-88- Rating change from previous democratic constitution, which was changed during a period of non-
democracy but remains in effect during democracy
Cont Dem Yrs
- Number of continuous democratic years completed at the beginning of the year.
Cont Dem Yrs No Ch
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-Number of continuous democratic years without a change in the constitutional emergency powers at the
beginning of the year. (Note: If a change happens in a given year, the counter resets in the next year. If a
rating is missing for a given year, this will also be missing.)
Break
0- No new democratic period begins
1- New democratic period begins
Table II.5: Emergency Power Strength: Factor Loadings
Power is Not Military-Specific 0.942
Policy Power 0.899
Vagueness 0.779
Declaration Power 0.585
Breadth of Definition 0.581
Policy Expiration Not Automatic 0.563
Domestic Power 0.550
State of Exception 0.548
Retrospective Checks 0.540
Activated in Crisis 0.521
Internal Emergency 0.511
Prior Checks 0.421
Non-Automatic Expiration 0.334
External Emergency 0.317
Attack Only 0.143
Table II.6: Democratic System and Emergency Powers (Country Years)
Presidential Parliamentary Mixed
Below Mean 1,260 924 273
51.28% 37.61% 11.11%
Above Mean 912 1,573 342
32.26% 55.64% 12.10%
24
Ta
bl
e
II
.4
:E
m
er
ge
nc
y
Po
w
er
St
re
ng
th
:C
od
in
g
E
xp
la
in
ed
St
at
e
of
E
xc
ep
tio
n
A
st
at
e
of
ex
ce
pt
io
n
ca
n
be
de
cl
ar
ed
(1
)o
ro
nl
y
w
ar
ca
n
be
de
cl
ar
ed
(0
)
B
re
ad
th
of
D
efi
ni
tio
n
T
he
de
fin
iti
on
of
a
tim
e
of
w
ar
,c
ri
si
s,
or
em
er
ge
nc
y
is
br
oa
d
(1
)o
rn
ar
ro
w
(0
).
N
on
-A
ut
om
at
ic
E
xp
ir
at
io
n
T
he
st
at
e
of
em
er
ge
nc
y
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
do
es
no
ta
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
ex
pi
re
af
te
rs
om
e
pr
e-
de
te
rm
in
ed
am
ou
nt
of
tim
e
(1
),
is
re
ne
w
ab
le
(1
),
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
ex
pi
re
s
af
te
rs
om
e
pr
e-
de
te
rm
in
ed
am
ou
nt
of
tim
e
(0
)o
ra
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
ex
pi
re
s
un
le
ss
ap
pr
ov
ed
by
an
ot
he
rb
od
y
(0
)
D
ec
la
ra
tio
n
Po
w
er
T
he
ex
ec
ut
iv
e
is
ab
le
to
de
cl
ar
e
a
tim
e
of
cr
is
is
or
em
er
ge
nc
y
al
on
e
(2
)i
n
co
nc
er
t(
1)
,o
rn
ot
at
al
l(
0)
.
A
tta
ck
O
nl
y
T
he
de
fin
iti
on
of
a
tim
e
of
cr
is
is
or
em
er
ge
nc
y
do
es
no
tr
eq
ui
re
ar
m
ed
at
ta
ck
(1
)o
ro
nl
y
in
cl
ud
es
ca
se
s
of
at
ta
ck
(0
).
A
ct
iv
at
ed
in
C
ri
si
s
T
he
de
fin
iti
on
of
a
tim
e
of
cr
is
is
or
em
er
ge
nc
y
in
cl
ud
e
cr
is
es
sh
or
to
fw
ar
(1
)o
rj
us
tw
ar
(0
).
In
te
rn
al
E
m
er
ge
nc
y
T
he
de
fin
iti
on
of
a
tim
e
of
cr
is
is
or
em
er
ge
nc
y
do
es
in
cl
ud
e
in
te
rn
al
di
st
ur
ba
nc
e
(1
)o
rd
oe
s
no
t(
0)
.
E
xt
er
na
lE
m
er
ge
nc
y
T
he
de
fin
iti
on
of
a
tim
e
of
em
er
ge
nc
y
in
cl
ud
es
ex
te
rn
al
di
st
ur
ba
nc
es
(1
)o
rd
oe
s
no
t(
0)
.
V
ag
ue
ne
ss
T
he
al
te
ra
tio
n
of
th
e
po
w
er
s
gr
an
te
d
to
th
e
ex
ec
ut
iv
e
ar
e
va
gu
e
(1
)o
rl
im
ite
d
(0
)
Po
w
er
is
N
ot
M
ili
ta
ry
-S
pe
ci
fic
T
he
ad
di
tio
na
lp
ow
er
gr
an
te
d
to
th
e
ch
ie
fe
xe
cu
tiv
e
in
tim
es
of
w
ar
/e
m
er
ge
nc
y
do
es
no
to
nl
y
co
rr
es
po
nd
sp
ec
ifi
ca
lly
to
th
e
m
an
ag
em
en
to
ft
he
ar
m
ed
fo
rc
es
(2
),
do
es
(1
)o
rn
o
po
w
er
s
ar
e
gr
an
te
d
(0
).
Po
lic
y
Po
w
er
T
he
le
ad
er
is
ab
le
to
m
ak
e
po
lic
y
de
cl
ar
at
io
ns
w
ith
th
e
fo
rc
e
of
la
w
w
ith
ou
tc
on
su
lti
ng
w
ith
th
e
ot
he
rb
ra
nc
he
s
of
go
ve
rn
m
en
t(
2)
,l
aw
on
ly
af
te
rc
on
su
lti
ng
w
ith
th
e
ot
he
rb
ra
nc
he
s
of
go
ve
rn
m
en
to
ro
th
er
ac
to
rs
ca
n
re
pe
al
th
em
(1
)
or
th
e
ch
ie
fe
xe
cu
tiv
e
is
no
ta
bl
e
to
m
ak
e
po
lic
y
de
cl
ar
at
io
ns
w
ith
th
e
fo
rc
e
of
la
w
(0
).
D
om
es
tic
Po
w
er
T
he
po
w
er
s
gr
an
te
d
to
th
e
ex
ec
ut
iv
e
in
cl
ud
e
an
ex
pl
ic
it
re
fe
re
nc
e
to
do
m
es
tic
po
w
er
s
(1
)o
rd
o
no
t(
0)
.
Po
lic
y
E
xp
ir
at
io
n
N
ot
A
ut
om
at
ic
T
he
po
lic
ie
s
en
ac
te
d
by
th
e
ex
ec
ut
iv
e
do
no
ta
ut
om
at
ic
al
ly
ex
pi
re
af
te
rs
om
e
pr
e-
de
te
rm
in
ed
am
ou
nt
of
tim
e
(1
),
au
to
m
at
ic
al
ly
ex
pi
re
af
te
rs
om
e
pr
e-
de
te
rm
in
ed
am
ou
nt
of
tim
e
(s
uc
h
as
w
he
n
th
e
pe
ri
od
of
em
er
ge
nc
y
en
ds
)(
0)
or
th
ey
m
us
tb
e
ap
pr
ov
ed
or
th
ey
w
ill
ex
pi
re
(0
).
Pr
io
rC
he
ck
s
T
he
nu
m
be
ro
fv
et
o
pl
ay
er
s
th
e
le
ad
er
fa
ce
s
du
ri
ng
th
e
cr
is
is
.
R
et
ro
sp
ec
tiv
e
C
he
ck
s
T
he
nu
m
be
ro
fp
os
t-
cr
is
is
ch
ec
ks
on
th
e
le
ad
er
s
ac
tio
ns
.
25
Table II.7: Invoked States of Emergency and Emergency Powers
(1) (2)
Probit IV Probit
Declared SOE
Emergency Power Strength 0.194∗∗∗ 0.879∗∗∗
(0.0739) (0.289)
Polity Score 0.0454 0.111
(0.0673) (0.0741)
Rivalry 0.984∗∗∗ 0.623∗
(0.141) (0.326)
War Onset 1.071∗∗ 0.790
(0.437) (0.515)
Trade (%GDP) 0.00450∗∗∗ 0.00387∗
(0.00147) (0.00228)
Real GDP (Logged) 0.251∗∗ 0.229
(0.110) (0.146)
Inequality 0.0457∗∗∗ 0.0163
(0.00876) (0.0148)
Democracy Years -0.00436 -0.0491
(0.0358) (0.0466)
Peace Years -0.262∗∗∗ -0.123
(0.0711) (0.0964)
Constant -5.092∗∗∗ -4.021∗∗
(1.249) (1.726)
Emergency Power Strength
Log Word Count 5.155∗∗∗
(0.514)
Log Word Count (Squared) -0.250∗∗∗
(0.0260)
Constant -25.93∗∗∗
(2.447)
Observations 995 841
Peace Year Splines Yes Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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CHAPTER III
Emergency Powers and International Conflict
III.1 Introduction
Scholars have devoted significant attention to how democratic and autocratic institutions differentially affect
a state’s propensity for international conflict [Gleditsch, 1992]. Recently, researchers have begun to examine
how variation within state institutions can explain why certain autocracies [Weeks, 2012] and democracies
[Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Clark and Nordstrom, 2005] are more conflictual than others. This work focuses
on how institutional constraints restrain leaders and prevent international conflict, treating constraints on the
executive as nearly exogenous predictors of the state’s likelihood of international conflict. However, many
democracies specify rules of governance during times of conflict that differ from those that exist in peacetime,
diverting substantial power to the head of state.
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 underscores how dramatically a leader’s power can increase during a cri-
sis. In 1971, civil disorder and sectarian violence in the province of East Pakistan brought India and Pakistan
to the brink of war. On December 3, open hostilities ignited between the states, prompting the government
of India to issue a Proclamation of Emergency, stating that the crisis threatened state security so gravely that
peacetime institutions were no longer sufficient. The formal power diverted to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi
was substantial. In the months that followed, Gandhi’s government regularly used this power as a means of
implementing policy during economic crisis and government disillusionment, preventing opposition groups
within the Parliament from effectively resisting government action [Omar, 2002]. When this initial emer-
gency proclamation was bolstered by a proclamation of emergency due to the threat of internal disturbance,
India subsequently experienced a 21-month period in which Prime Minister Gandhi ruled by decree.
Established in the Indian Constitution of 1949, formal rules regarding a state of emergency predate this
crisis with Pakistan by over two decades. Could the attraction of these powers have influenced how Prime
Minister Gandhi negotiated with Pakistan during the crisis? I argue that since emergency provisions can
drastically reduce the restrictions on democratically elected executives during times of international conflict,
this relaxation of constraints can incentivize leaders to prefer conflict to peace to bolster their domestic
control. This study makes two contributions to our understanding of the relationship between domestic
political institutions and interstate conflict. First, the manipulation of emergency powers provides a rational
motivation for conflict not previously examined in studies of international politics. Second, the finding that
emergency provisions might explain why certain democratic governments are as conflict prone as autocracies
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is a novel qualification of our existing understanding of the role of domestic institutions in predicting conflict.
I begin by discussing how scholars treat constraints on the executive during peacetime as a restraining
force preventing international conflict. I explain that in democracies peacetime constraints and constraints
during crises differ substantially. Since emergency provisions reduce the institutional constraints placed on
the leader during times of conflict, leaders have an incentive to prefer conflict to peace in cases where a
peaceful bargain would otherwise be preferable. In chapter 1, I collected original data on emergency provi-
sions, examining 147 state constitutions, over 500 amendments, and all relevant legislative acts in democratic
states from 1816 to 2012 and developed a novel measure of emergency power strength using Bayesian factor
analysis on a series of power granting and power restricting passages within emergency provisions. Using
those data, I find that that states with stronger emergency powers exhibit a substantially higher propensity for
militarized interstate disputes.
Since emergency power provision and conflict behavior are in part determined by the same factors, this
baseline test does not sufficiently demonstrate causality. To account for endogeneity, I perform several addi-
tional analyses. I first perform analyses that exclude the years immediately following emergency provision
adoption and find consistent results. I then instrument for emergency power strength using constitutional
word count, relating the level of authority granted in a legal statute to the specificity of the language in that
statute [Huber and Shipan, 2002]. Exploiting this plausibly exogenous determinant of emergency power
strength to identify exogenous variation in the latent measure of emergency power strength, I find that the
effect remains strong and significant. Lastly, I demonstrate the full causal chain of the theory. I find that
militarized interstate disputes are more likely to result in a declaration of emergency under strong emergency
powers than when powers are weak. A direct consequence of leaders’ abilities to expand power through
the invocation of emergency provisions is an increased likelihood that they will prefer conflict to access that
power.
III.2 Political Institutions and Executive Constraints
Scholars have long argued that differences between democratic and autocratic institutions are central to the
state’s propensity for international conflict.1 While there is strong evidence that democracies are less likely
to wage war against one another [Babst, 1972; Ray, 1995], the underlying cause of this democratic peace has
long faced scrutiny [Maoz and Russett, 1993], with some denying that peace is attributable to the democratic
institutions of these states [Rosato, 2003; Gartzke, 2007; Gibler, 2007]. Further, since the pacific nature of
democracies does not hold when the unit of analysis is the polity or leader [Maoz and Abdolali, 1989; Debs
and Goemans, 2010], the association between conflict and regime type is more complex than a straightforward
1See [Gleditsch, 1992] for an introduction.
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relationship between democracy and peace. However, scholars have also critiqued these works over research
design techniques [Slantchev et al., 2005; Dafoe, 2011], and these studies do not attempt to unpack the
institutions within democracies that determine conflict propensity.
The distinction between autocracy and democracy is not sufficient due to the substantial variation of
institutions within these broader categories. For example, the type of domestic audience the leader faces and
the mechanisms the audience has for restraining or removing overly belligerent leaders account for significant
variation in rates of autocratic conflict initiation [Weeks, 2012]. Certain autocratic states – those with civilian
regimes with powerful elite audiences – are not significantly more bellicose than the average democratic state.
When likewise examining institutional variation within democracies and international conflict, scholars
primarily consider how democracies construct institutions to restrain the leader from using force. While early
studies found no difference in the conflict propensity of presidential and parliamentary regimes [Reiter and
Tillman, 2002; Clark and Nordstrom, 2005], scholars have recently found evidence that leaders of presidential
democracies may be more conflict prone [Chiozza and Goemans, 2011]. In parliamentary regimes, leaders
under majoritarian systems are considerably more likely to initiate or participate in international conflict
than those under proportional representation systems [Leblang and Chan, 2003], but the state’s propensity
for international conflict does not vary whether the current ruling block represents a majority, coalition, or
minority government [Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Clark and Nordstrom, 2005]. In presidential and mixed
systems, whether there is unified or divided government exerts no influence on conflict behavior [Leblang
and Chan, 2003], although congressional support is a positive predictor of major uses of force in the United
States [Howell and Pevehouse, 2011].
Leaders show greater restraint in initiating conflicts abroad when the legislature exerts greater control
over foreign policy, such as congressional control over treaty ratification [Reiter and Tillman, 2002; Clark
and Nordstrom, 2005], and additional structural veto points correspond to demonstrably less assertive foreign
policy [Ferejohn and Rosenbluth, 2008]. The diffuseness of political accountability directly affects the will-
ingness to use force [Koch and Gartner, 2005], with higher levels of both political participation [Reiter and
Tillman, 2002] and inclusivity decreasing the likelihood a leader will initiate an interstate dispute [Ferejohn
and Rosenbluth, 2008]. In sum, leaders of democracies who face high barriers to conflictual behavior avoid
using force, while those with low costs are more willing to engage in potentially conflictual situations [Palmer
et al., 2004].
These studies focus on how democracies design institutions to prevent the executive from engaging in
foreign conflict. However, while this is central to understanding the relationship between democratic institu-
tions and conflict behavior, the relationship between constraints and conflict is not unidirectional. In many
democracies, standard constraints on the political behavior of the executive are reduced or removed in times
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of military conflict, allowing leaders to utilize powers typically reserved for autocrats. In these democracies,
constraints on the executive are not exogenous determinants of conflict behavior – they are partly endogenous
to conflict.
III.3 Emergency Powers and Conflict
The state’s conflict status can determine the level of constraint on the executive in democracies due to the
presence of emergency provisions. Emergency provisions are legal acts that expand the purview of state
actors during times of international or domestic crisis. Emergency provisions vary across several dimensions,
as I described in the previous chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, I am interested in the significant
variation in the scope of application and depth of the power granted to executives during times of conflict.
At the low end of this variation, in 12% of cases, the leader can declare a state of emergency but sees no
meaningful increase in their power. In a further 12% of cases the leader has the ability to suspend certain
rights or civil liberties, but can take no policy action. Provisions that grant policy power can also specify
substantial constraints. Under the current Constitution of the Philippines, the President can direct national
policy during a state of emergency if Congress has declared an emergency via a two-thirds vote, but Congress
must authorize any emergency powers and sets restrictions on the timeframe and extent of these powers
(Constitution of the Philippines, 1987, Section 23 Articles 1-2).
However, there are also emergency provisions that grant the leader broad, sweeping power. The Constitu-
tion of South Korea of 1987 grants the President the authority to proclaim martial law and introduce special
measures to ensure the public safety without the consent of the National Assembly, which can lift martial law
only retroactively through a majority vote (Article 77.1-5). Often, as in the Macedonian Constitution of 1992,
emergency provisions grant the leader the ability to “issue decrees with the force of law (Article 126)” during
a crisis. The Colombian Constitution of 1992 simply grants the president “the powers strictly necessary to
repel the aggression (Article 212),” with no further limitations. Nearly 40% of emergency provisions grant
this extensive level of policy power.
The breadth of such provisions allows the leader to influence policy in areas outside of the emergency.
Framers who enact emergency provisions must therefore consider the tradeoff between democratic ideals
and stability. There is some risk that a leader will abuse their enhanced powers to circumvent the state’s
institutions. If the leader successfully prosecutes the conflict using the emergency powers, this risk may be
worth the reward. The prevalence of emergency provisions suggests states are willing to make this tradeoff.
However, the very existence of these emergency powers may cause leaders to prefer conflict to peace in the
first place. Emergency provisions alter the balance of domestic political power during times of conflict. This
reduction of constraints can provide great benefit for the leader that can only be accessed when the nation is
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engaged in such conflict.2
Rational democratic leaders will attempt to maintain themselves in office by enacting the policies nec-
essary to retain the support of their winning coalition. If a state leader engages in an international crisis,
emergency powers may prove an attractive tool to achieve her policy agenda, particularly when she envi-
sions enacting her desired policy goals is otherwise costly.3 Emergency powers tilt the balance of political
power towards the executive during times of conflict.4 Even narrow emergency provisions grant democratic
leaders a number of repressive tools to silence the opposition and inhibit potential opponents from coor-
dinating against the government. Emergency powers often extend the executive’s control further, granting
near-dictatorial power for the duration of the conflict. In a number of cases, emergency provisions grant
leaders the ability to make policy declarations with the force of law and to combat the threat ‘by any means
necessary.’ Further, this power often extends past decision-making relating specifically to military operations
regarding the threat at hand. In the previously referenced Honduran Constitution of 1982, the executive can
seize control over domestic political tools such as the collection of taxes and the allocation of the budget.
Such broad powers can allow the leader to assert control over the domestic agenda and may prove a desirable
tool to solidify their presence in office.
Emergency provisions that are conditional on external threat and interstate conflict can expand the leader’s
power, but she must engage the state in costly conflict to do so. As in a typical bargaining framework, when
making or receiving offers over a conflicted good, the leader weighs the benefits of using force against the
costs of war. The political benefits of expanding power through emergency provisions form an important
component of this decision calculus.5 Holding costs constant, emergency powers increase the range of status
quo positions that the leader is willing to challenge and decreases the range of offers that the leader is willing
to accept.6 This intuition follows from the result that the expected probability of war is weakly decreasing in
the cost of war [Fearon, 1995], as emergency powers serve to offset some portion of the costs of war. In a
world of pervasive uncertainty, as this pre-conflict bargaining range shrinks, the probability of a successfully
bargain falls, and conflict becomes more likely.7 Further, scholars have shown that even in a world with no
uncertainty, if the ratio of the share of benefits to the share of costs of conflict is positive for the leader, the
bargaining range can meaningfully disappear and conflict can ensue [Jackson and Morelli, 2007]. All else
2Leaders can invoke emergency provisions in times of internal disturbance. However, inviting domestic turmoil is arguably riskier
than inviting international conflict, given the low probability of interstate conquest.
3This may occur when the strength of the opposition or the polarization of the parties makes compromise improbable, for example.
4This is distinct from the diversionary theory of war, which has received mixed empirical support. Here, the leader is institutionally
advantaged by conflict and is not dependent on rally effects or redirecting public attention.
5I present a graphical depiction of the argument in the appendix.
6Additional results derived from the bargaining model hold with the addition of emergency powers. For example, states with lower
costs for war will still be more likely to engage in conflict, holding emergency power strength constant.
7Additionally, in a world where there is uncertainty over the probable outcome of war, a pre-conflict agreement between the leader
and her domestic opponents is also unlikely.
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equal, states with emergency provisions will be more likely to engage in conflict than those without, because
the leaders of these states will push for harder bargains that are more likely to result in bargaining failure.
The more power granted during an emergency, the larger the average effect on the likelihood of conflict, as
the personal benefits the leader derives from conflict will offset the costs of waging war to a greater extent.
Hypothesis 1: Democracies with strong emergency powers have a higher propensity for international
conflict than democracies with weak or no emergency powers.
III.4 The Decision to Grant Emergency Powers
Though there are few direct accounts of the decision to adopt emergency powers, historical accounts of
constitution-making in democracies suggests factors that influence the decision to adopt emergency powers.
Framers of democratic institutions grant emergency powers due to the high stakes of international conflict
[Rossiter, 1948]. A number of factors that influence the likelihood of conflict might therefore also drive the
decision to adopt emergency provisions and lead to a spurious finding.
As discussed in Chapter 1, states that have experienced a greater number of international conflicts should
be likely to adopt strong emergency powers. Scholars also suggest that states facing a looming threat such as
an international rival are significantly more likely to deliver powers to the executive in times of emergency
to guard against future confrontations with the rival. Framers likewise grant emergency powers when they
strongly fear the vulnerability of the nation’s peacetime institutions to internal threats such as rebellion or
economic collapse.
Testing the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict in a manner that supports causal
inference requires careful specification. I expect that there are both observable and unobservable factors that
are related to both the adoption of emergency powers and conflict behavior, and this can lead to a spurious
result. In the following section, I describe the steps taken to test this relationship while accounting for these
threats to causal inference.
III.5 Empirical Analysis
Since there is no individual technique that can definitively demonstrate a causal relationship between my
quantities of interest, I take several approaches in my identification strategy. Each test, taken alone, faces
some theoretical or methodological limitations. As a result, they constitute parts of a larger test. A consistent
effect across specifications should increase confidence in a causal relationship between emergency power
strength and international conflict.
The key independent variable of interest is the measure of emergency power strength I described in
chapter 1. My dependent variable is the onset of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) for each democracy-
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year using the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Disputes dataset [Jones et al., 1996].8 MIDs
capture a wide range of military crises that may trigger emergency provisions. In the appendix, I consider
alternative dependent variables.9
I begin with a model designed to serve as a baseline for setting expectations about the strength of the
relationship. I include a number of controls in this baseline model to avoid a spurious finding. It is possible
that both emergency power strength and conflict are driven by a culture or history of conflict within the state.
As a result, I control for the count of previous militarized interstate disputes involving the state up to the given
year [Sarkees and Wayman, 2010]. Since the presence of rival states could be related to emergency power
strength and rivals engage in militarized disputes in greater numbers than other states [Goertz and Diehl, 1993;
Goertz and Diehl, 1995], I control for the presence of an interstate rivalry [Thompson and Dreyer, 2011].10
States with greater power projection capabilities may be associated with both conflict and stronger emergency
powers in the expectation of future conflict. To account for this, I control for the material capabilities or CINC
score for each state-year [Singer et al., 1972].11 I control for the presence of a civil war [Sarkees and Wayman,
2010] since states experiencing domestic turmoil are also likely to engage in international conflict [Chiozza
and Goemans, 2011], and domestic turmoil may drive emergency power adoption. Lastly, I control for each
state’s Polity score [Marshall and Jaggers, 2001], to test how peacetime institutions are related to conflict
behavior.12
As the dependent variable is binary, I estimate a logistic regression where the unit of analysis is the
democracy-year. The analysis covers from 1946-2008.13 I present all results using robust standard errors.14
To control for country-specific factors that might both account for the existence of an emergency provision
in a country and the likelihood of conflict in that same country, I include two models with country fixed
effects.15 To account for temporal trends and duration dependence I include polynomial temporal controls
for the time since the state last experienced a militarized interstate dispute and polynomial temporal controls
8Using data on invocation [Hafner-Burton et al., 2011], from 1970 to 2007, I find roughly 30% invocations of states of emergency
coincide with MIDs. I consider the possibility of reverse causality in the appendix. I find strong emergency powers interact with crises
to produce states of emergency, rather than states of emergency leading to disputes.
9I use conflict onset as the dependent variable rather than conflict initiation, as the theory suggests that leaders who can access
emergency powers will take riskier stances in bargaining, not that they will be the first mover if bargaining breaks down. Nevertheless, I
find the results hold using MID initiation as the dependent variable. Several robustness checks contained in the appendix use the onset
of a war as the dependent variable [Sarkees and Wayman, 2010]. The results are consistent with the analysis for MIDs, but are less
precisely estimated.
10Since alliances may drive a spurious relationship through a similar mechanism, I include a robustness check where I control for
NATO membership. The results do not change. I show this result in the appendix.
11As an alternative measure of power projection, I include major power status. The results are unchanged. I display this result in the
appendix.
12As an additional measure of democratic institutions, I control for whether the state has a presidential or parliamentary system. The
results hold. I show this in the appendix.
13This is due to the inclusion of civil war data as a control. Excluding this variable allows me to examine the time frame of 1848 to
2008. I find that the relationship between emergency powers and conflict holds across this time frame as well.
14I present models with clustered standard errors in the appendix with similar results. However, clustering standard errors violates the
assumptions of logistic regression.
15In large samples there is likely no difference in the bias between an unconditional and conditional logit when the model contains
fixed effects [Katz, 2001].
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since the state was last nondemocratic [Carter and Signorino, 2010].16 I further provide a model that accounts
for the uncertainty in the Bayesian measure in the appendix [Crabtree and Fariss, 2015].
Table III.1: Emergency Powers and MID Onset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MID Onset MID Onset MID Onset MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.168∗∗∗ 0.259∗ 0.184∗∗∗ 0.270∗
(0.0570) (0.138) (0.0644) (0.149)
Rivalry 1.257∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗ 1.069∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.221) (0.129) (0.238)
Civil War 0.854∗ 0.0957 0.809∗ -0.0511
(0.453) (0.425) (0.435) (0.435)
CINC Score 16.63∗∗∗ -7.985 19.67∗∗∗ -5.615
(5.052) (8.725) (4.554) (9.165)
Past MIDs 0.00680∗∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗ 0.00770∗∗∗ -0.00779
(0.00135) (0.00420) (0.00136) (0.00630)
Polity Score 0.0860∗∗ -0.000540 0.123∗∗ -0.0148
(0.0404) (0.0862) (0.0508) (0.0986)
Constant -1.617∗∗∗ 3.960∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗ 3.634∗∗
(0.203) (1.329) (0.246) (1.590)
Observations 2795 2497 2569 2338
Country Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Temporal Dependence Polynomials No No Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
Table III.1 displays the initial results. Model 1 is the baseline model. Model 2 adds country fixed effects.
Model 3 adds peace-year polynomials and democracy-year polynomials. Model 4 includes both the country
fixed effects and the temporal polynomials. In Models 1 and 3, emergency powers are a statistically significant
positive predictor of a militarized interstate dispute. In Model 3, considering a state at the maximum value
of emergency powers rather than a state with no emergency powers, with continuous variables held constant
at their means and binary variables held at their modes, results in a statistically significant change in the
predicted probability of MID onset from .228 to .304, as depicted in Figure III.1. This is a nearly eight-
percentage point or 33% increase in the predicted probability of a MID. A shift from the 25th percentile to
the 75th percentile of emergency power strength changes the predicted probability of MID onset from .231
to .288, a greater than five percentage point or 25% increase in the predicted probability of a MID. This
difference is statistically significant. The baseline model suggests that the conflict propensity of states with
16The results are also robust to year fixed effects, presented in the appendix.
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strong emergency powers is significantly higher than those without strong emergency powers.17
Figure III.1: Predicted Probabilities of MID Onset
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Looking at the specifications using country fixed effects, it is first of note that many countries do not sig-
nificantly alter their emergency powers throughout the analysis.18 In Figure III.2, I display the maximum and
minimum constitutional emergency power strength scores for each democracy in which there is a substantive
shift in the strength of the emergency provision. These shifts occur across a number of countries, and many
of the shifts are quite important; however, the total number of substantive shifts in emergency power strength
is relatively low. Since the independent variable of interest changes rarely over time, there is little within
country variation.19 As a result, the fixed effects will soak up most of the explanatory power of those vari-
ables [Beck, 2001]. Further, as the dependent variable is a rare event, some states never experience conflict
and thus do not influence the parameter estimates [Beck and Katz, 2001]. This means that even if a within
country effect exists, the lack of variation in the independent variable may not allow me to estimate the effect.
17There may be concern that the relationship is influenced by cases where the emergency powers apply to domestic crises or hu-
manitarian emergencies rather than external conflicts. However, emergency provisions that do not specifically refer to external conflicts
uniformly receive low score for emergency power strength. There are 56 instances of militarized interstate dispute onset under emer-
gency powers that do not specifically apply to external crises. All but three of these are contained within the lowest 10% of values of the
emergency power strength variable, and only one is above the lowest 25%.
18There are 39 instances of substantial emergency power revision. This should help alleviate concerns regarding endogeneity. If
emergency provisions were truly endogenous to conflict, they should change much more frequently in response to conflict. I find no
relationship between conflict and the decision to change emergency powers, which should also alleviate causal concerns regarding the
use of fixed effects.
19Since emergency power strength is calculated in a Bayesian framework, there is year-to-year variation in emergency power strength
that results from the iterative process calculating different posterior means from the same set of inputs.
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Figure III.2: Constitutional Emergency Power Strength Across Countries
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However, the fixed effects models do recover an effect of emergency power strength on conflict onset.
This effect is substantively larger than the effect in the baseline model. Although emergency power strength
reaches only the 90% confidence level in a two-tailed test in both Model 2 and 4, the relationship is significant
at the 95% confidence level with a one-tailed test (p-values of .030 and .035 respectively).20 This provides
significant evidence that a change in emergency power provision results in a change in conflict propensity.
These baseline models provide initial evidence of a relationship between the strength of emergency pow-
ers in democracies and the likelihood of a military conflict. However, despite the inclusion of country-fixed
effects, concerns over endogeneity remain. First, if the originating conditions for emergency power adoption
influence future conflict behavior this may be driving the results. Further, if the framers of the emergency
provisions grant stronger emergency powers because they anticipate conflict will occur in the near future, the
relationship would not be causal.21 Instead of emergency power strength causing conflict, emergency powers
would be caused by the anticipation of future conflict.
To examine if it is indeed the originating conditions and not the emergency powers themselves that are
driving conflict behavior, I exclude the immediate post-adoption years. This model relies on the assumption
that the original motivation for adoption dissipates over time while the emergency powers remain. For this
analysis, I exclude all country-years in the first year following adoption, the first five years, the first ten years,
and the first fifteen years following adoption. I present these results in Table III.2.
20Since this reduced precision results from inflated standard errors, it is likely that this results from reduced variation to leverage,
rather than a reduced effect. Further, I find that emergency power strength is a strong and significant predictor for conflict onset when
region fixed effects, which account for a significant portion of the cross-national variation, are utilized instead. This model is in the
appendix.
21One such endogenous relationship is nonetheless consistent with my theory. If future leaders themselves are involved in the writing
of emergency provisions, they should push for rules diverting greater powers to the executive in times of future conflict. Further, this
effect should be greater if they are leaders anticipate a number of future crises. However, it is difficult to assess systematically or
empirically how involved future leaders are in the drafting process.
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Table III.2: Future MID Onset and Emergency Powers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One Year On Five Years On 10 Years On 15 Years On
Emergency Power Strength 0.182∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗ 0.176∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0709) (0.0786) (0.0874)
Rivalry 1.093∗∗∗ 1.008∗∗∗ 1.087∗∗∗ 1.284∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.149) (0.169) (0.195)
Civil War 1.026∗ 1.046∗ 1.204∗ 1.173
(0.551) (0.596) (0.675) (0.735)
CINC Score 18.47∗∗∗ 18.43∗∗∗ 16.94∗∗∗ 16.19∗∗∗
(4.497) (4.512) (4.627) (4.789)
Polity Score 0.126∗∗ 0.139∗∗ 0.124∗ 0.107
(0.0535) (0.0602) (0.0750) (0.0914)
Past MIDs 0.00821∗∗∗ 0.00776∗∗∗ 0.00886∗∗∗ 0.00896∗∗∗
(0.00141) (0.00147) (0.00154) (0.00163)
Constant -3.250∗∗∗ -3.378∗∗∗ -3.714∗∗∗ -3.540∗∗∗
(0.466) (0.538) (0.683) (0.868)
Observations 2407 2100 1827 1526
Temporal Dependence Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
The relationship between emergency power strength and conflict remains significant when excluding the
years immediately following the adoption of emergency powers. The magnitudes across different time frames
display only mild variation. This analysis suggests that unless the originating conditions for emergency
powers persist for a great many years, the relationship between emergency powers and conflict behavior is
independent of the factors that drive emergency power choice.
To further support a causal relationship, I utilize the predominant statistical method to confront endo-
geneity – instrumental variable analysis. Instruments selected to reflect many of the systematic components
of emergency power determination – the state’s past and present conflict environment or the state’s history
of domestic instability – would almost certainly have an independent effect on crisis behavior.22 Clearly
exogenous portions of emergency powers, such as the portion of a constitution that is taken directly from
neighboring constitutions, are difficult to measure. Further, it is not clear how they would explain variation
in emergency power strength.
I instrument for emergency power strength using the word count of the state’s constitution. Framers can
choose to incorporate emergency provisions into constitutions, or they can choose to exclude these provisions.
22One possibility to minimize the impact of this issue is to select an instrumental variable based on the component’s value at the time
of emergency power adoption, as time should diminish the importance of the originating factors of emergency power provision. In the
appendix I perform one such analysis, utilizing the count of past irregular leader turnover events free from foreign intervention at the
emergency provision’s time of adoption. I find strong support for the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict onset.
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More verbose constitutions are more likely to spell out institutional arrangements for a greater number of
contingencies and more words are necessary to spell out additional powers. As such, longer constitutions
are more likely to contain emergency provisions that grant emergency powers and, in the case of emergency
powers, I have argued that codification of powers within a formal document is vital for their strength.
However, the literature on bureaucratic discretion [Huber and Shipan, 2002] suggests that the level of
policy detail written into authorizing statutes determines the authority the bureaucracy has to influence policy
at the implementation stage. Huber and Shipan argue that verbosity generally corresponds with specificity,
lower freedom of interpretation, and reduced discretion. High word counts in statutes therefore imply a
lower level of discretion for the agent. Following this logic, framers that adopt more verbose constitutions
should also be more likely to craft more specific, and thus less powerful, emergency power provisions. Once
framers specify emergency powers, additional language can only serve to qualify and restrict those powers.
Thus the relationship between constitutional word count and emergency power strength is likely nonlinear –
positive initially, where states institutionalize the existence of additional powers, but eventually negative, as
they qualify these powers. To account for this possibility I model the relationship with a quadratic form.
To construct the instrument, I first count the number of words in each state’s constitution.23 For democra-
cies where the constitution is not available in English, I use Huber and Shipan’s verbosity multiplier to correct
for the document’s language [Huber and Shipan, 2002].24 I subtract the number of words in the emergency
power provision and all passages that refer to violent internal or external conflict, which might inflate the
word count of a constitution due to the expectation of conflict, from this number. This ensures that I am
not creating a measure that serves as a proxy for emergency power strength that would be susceptible to the
same endogeneity concerns as the original measure. I take the natural log of this number, to correct for the
skew of the word count data, and use both this number and its square as instruments, to model a curvilinear
relationship.25
It is often difficult to satisfy the exclusion restriction when conducting instrumental variable analyses,
particularly in political science, where endogeneity pervades not just our variables of interest, but also their
correlates. Though there are a number of ways in which state constitutions may influence conflict behavior,
there is no obvious direct relationship between the number of words in the constitution and the likelihood of
23I do not include states that have extra-constitutional emergency powers in this analysis. It is not clear that the same relationship
exists between constitutional structure and emergency powers in states that separate emergency provisions from constitutions. This drops
just 10 cases from the sample in the previous models.
24This is just 705 observations in the full sample. I include results without these corrections, which are virtually identical, in the
appendix.
25A recent econometric study [Dieterle and Snell, 2014] suggests that using a measure and its square to instrument for an endogenous
regressor can improve instrumentation and model fit, as long as concerns about over identification can be allayed. I find that when I do
not include the squared term, the results are consistent but the model is less precisely estimated. I present this result in the appendix.
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international conflict.26 I therefore suggest that this is a plausibly exogenous instrument and results consistent
with the remainder of my analyses should increase confidence in a causal relationship.
Figure III.3: Emergency Power Strength and Constitutional Word Count
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Constitutional word count and its square strongly instrument for the measure of emergency powers.27
Figure III.3 presents a graphical depiction of the relationship that follows the predicted curvilinear form.
General practice suggests that an F-statistic of 10 in the first stage is sufficient for a strong instrument. The
F-statistic from the first stage of the model is 87.63. This indicates that weak-identification is not a problem
and that the excluded regressors are strong predictors of emergency powers. In light of the decision not to use
the just-identified model, I run a test for over identification. The test of over identifying restrictions returns a
p-value of 0.9373, suggesting that over identification is not a concern. In each instrumental variable model,
I utilize the same set of controls as in the original specification– Polity scores, material capabilities or CINC
score, interstate rivalry, previous militarized interstate disputes, and the presence of a civil war.28
26It is possible that there is an indirect relationship between a history of internal conflict, long passages in constitutions that spell out
power-sharing arrangements, and the probability of future internal conflict, which itself can be a predictor of external conflict [Gleditsch
et al., 2008]. However, I explicitly control for this indirect possibility using controls for civil war and domestic institutions, and several
other controls in my robustness checks, since instrumental variable analysis parcels out only the variation in emergency power strength
that is attributable to word count, separate from all other controls. Further, such a provision will account for only a small portion of a
constitution’s word count.
27I conduct a placebo test using Polity scores in the appendix, and find that constitutional word count predicts and instruments for
Polity scores very poorly.
28As a robustness check, I control for the effect of time (1-(1/Year-Adoption Year)), which indicates whether years closer to or farther
away from the year of adoption are associated with a higher probability of MID onset. The results are virtually identical.
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Table III.3: Instrumental Variable Analysis: MID Onset
(1) (2)
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.379∗∗ 0.389∗∗
(0.165) (0.189)
Constant -1.903∗∗∗ -2.206∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.357)
Emergency Power Strength
Log Constitutional Word Count 2.736∗∗∗ 3.172∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.404)
Log Constitutional Word Count (Squared) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0205)
Constant -13.38∗∗∗ -14.99∗∗∗
(1.966) (1.975)
Observations 2384 2174
Temporal Dependence Polynomials No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
The first stage results capture the relationship between constitutional word count and emergency power
strength using ordinary least squares, while the second stage estimates a probit regression.29 As shown in
Table III.3 and Figure III.4, the results of the instrumental models are consistent with the initial model.30
Although the models are not directly comparable, since the predicted probability of conflict under strong
emergency powers is higher in this model than in previous models, as shown in Figure III.4, there is little
evidence that the relationship is weaker than first suggested. If the instruments do not have an independent
relationship with future conflict behavior, the relationship between emergency power strength and conflict
onset is unlikely to have been found purely due omitted variable bias.
29I use a second-stage probit regression as there is no clear method to calculate the standard errors for a second stage logit. This makes
the further use of country fixed effects difficult, as the returned standard errors may be biased [Greene, 2004]. Further, in this model
country fixed effects would make precise estimation difficult, given the estimation issues described earlier, and prove overly stringent.
To account for this, I perform an instrumental variable analysis using a linear probability model with region fixed effects and robust
standard errors in the appendix. The results are consistent with the results here.
30I present the full specification in the appendix.
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Figure III.4: Instrumental Variable Analysis
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Each test performed is indicative of the same result – emergency power strength is a positive predictor of
international conflict. These results hold years into the future when it is likely that the originating conditions
that drive emergency powers are no longer present, indicating that it is unlikely these results are being driven
by the anticipation of conflict. Most stringently, the results hold using an instrument that is theoretically
exogenous. This analysis provides strong evidence for the theoretical link between emergency power strength
and the willingness of the leader to engage in conflict.
While I have demonstrated that there is a strong relationship between emergency power strength and
conflict onset, the full causal argument suggests that for states with strong emergency powers, conflict onset
will result in the invocation of a state of emergency, so that the executive can make use of the extraordinary
powers. I test this final link in the causal chain using data on declared states of emergencies from 1970
to 2007 [Hafner-Burton et al., 2011]. My dependent variable captures whether or not a government has
declared a state of emergency in a given year. My key variable of interest is an interaction between conflict
onset and emergency power strength. To ensure the appropriate temporal order, I lag the onset of a militarized
interstate dispute by one year. I use a number of controls to avoid a spurious result – Polity scores, previous
militarized interstate disputes, interstate rivalry and the presence of a civil war, as well as the percentage
of the population deemed powerless [Cederman et al., 2010], ethno-linguistic fractionalization [Collier and
Hoeffler, 2004], the count of previous coups within the state [Powell and Thyne, 2011], the state’s level of
inequality (Gini coefficient) [World Bank, 2007], and GDP per capita [Gleditsch, 2002]. I estimate a logistic
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regression where the unit of analysis is the democracy-year and include polynomial temporal controls.
Table III.4: Emergency Powers, MIDs, and Declared SOEs
Declared SOE
MID Onset (Lagged) -0.207
(0.134)
Emergency Power Strength 0.0551
(0.0603)
MID Onset (Lagged) × Emergency Power Strength 0.232∗∗
(0.115)
Constant -1.252∗∗∗
(0.463)
Observations 1618
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
I present the results in Table III.12.31 As the results demonstrate, militarized interstate disputes are a
strong predictor of the declaration of a state of emergency, but only in states with strong emergency powers.
While a democracy that has experienced a conflict in the previous year and has the lowest level of emer-
gency powers has just a 13% probability of declaring a state of emergency, a state with the highest possible
emergency powers has a 28% probability of declaring a state of emergency. This difference suggests that
states that have strong emergency powers are markedly more likely to declare an emergency when a conflict
occurs. When coupled with the results that show that emergency powers are a strong predictor of conflict
onset, this suggests that emergency powers do indeed drive leaders to invite conflict so that they may access
these powers.
III.6 Conclusion
The limitation of centralized political power is a long held democratic value designed to ward off tyranny.
The separation of powers specifically improves both accountability and transparency in government [Persson
et al., 1997]. If the balance of power in democracies is sufficiently re-ordered during times of emergency,
this creates incentives for leaders to take on a greater risk of international conflict or to seek out conflicts
that will cause emergencies. This provides a rationalist explanation for conflict that is driven by domestic
politics rather than strictly by the interactions between states. This raises two key points. First, the rules
and institutions of democratic governance exert an influence on international conflict. Second, when the
centralization of political power is effectuated during times of conflict, there is no guarantee that power
will shift back when the crisis dissipates. Instead, powers extended during war often shape governance in
31I present the full specification in the appendix.
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peacetime for many years post-conflict, and sometimes indefinitely [Corwin, 1984]. This calls into question
the way we currently view democratic states, as we must reconsider whether states with strong emergency
powers truly qualify as liberal democracies.
In this chapter, I provide two central contributions to the study of political institutions and international
conflict. The first contribution is to explain some variation in democratic conflict through examining the
impact of democratic institutions on foreign policy decision-making, and vice versa. Scholars have primarily
considered the ways in which democratic institutions constrain the ability of a leader to use force abroad.
I demonstrate that it is not always the case that democratic institutions restrain conflict behavior. In some
instances the direction of this relationship is reversed – conflict minimizes the domestic constraints on the
leader, and thus leaders invite conflict. This study thus improves our understanding of the causes of conflict,
and specifically when and why we see democratic leaders engage in conflict.32
Finally, I again demonstrate one way in which variation within states that share the same regime type
is as important as differences between regimes of different types, and thus emphasize the importance of
capturing these differences in our measures and models. I demonstrate that in democracies with strong
emergency powers, the distinction between autocracy and war-time democracy can be unclear. Future studies
of the association between regime type and conflict must consider institutional structure in a way that moves
beyond the traditional separation of democracy and autocracy. This will require scholars to advance measures
of democracy and autocracy. It is important to measure variation within regime type in regards to the quantity
in question. When we consider differential impacts of democratic institutions in times of conflict, we must
ensure that we are examining the relevant institutions for times of conflict, and not peacetime institutions.
32In Author (Unpublished), I find similar results for the relationship between emergency powers and the escalation of crises, to the
level of direct military engagement and violence.
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III.7 Appendix
Graphical Depiction of Theory
Figure 1
State 1 State 2
(0) (1)pp− c1 p+ c2
I present a graphical depiction of the traditional bargaining model of war in Figure 1. Here, the offer that
the states will accept is determined solely by the probability their side will prevail in conflict, as determined
by their relative capabilities (p) and their costs (c). Any offer that is made by either side that falls into the
bargaining range (the area between p− c1 and p+ c2 will be accepted and war will be avoided. Any offer
made outside of that range will be rejected, and conflict will follow. Conflict results when each side’s relative
capabilities (p), their costs (c), or both are not known, and thus the acceptable bargaining range is uncertain.
Figure 2
Leader 1 Leader 2
(0) (1)pp− c1+b p+ c2
When engaging in international bargaining, leaders in democratic states that grant institutional emergency
powers will push for a more favorable bargaining than their relative capabilities would dictate because their
personal acceptable bargaining range includes an adjustment for the additional domestic power they receive
in the event of international conflict. I depict this in Figure 2. Leaders must be compensated for forgoing
the personal benefit of conflict (b) with additional concessions from the opponent. As a result, the range of
outcomes that is acceptable for both sides shrinks. This results in a higher likelihood that uncertainty will
result in bargaining failure due to the narrow margin for error in offers between the two sides.
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Table III.5: Emergency Powers and Component Parts
(1)
Emergency Powers
Declaration 0.0795∗∗∗
(0.00768)
Exception 0.117∗∗∗
(0.0137)
Breadth 0.101∗∗∗
(0.0168)
Civil Emergency 0.0513∗∗∗
(0.0181)
Crisis 0.0923∗∗∗
(0.0137)
External Emergency 0.0699∗∗∗
(0.0250)
Attack 0.0196
(0.0259)
Powers 0.534∗∗∗
(0.0133)
Vagueness 0.222∗∗∗
(0.0129)
Domestic 0.0963∗∗∗
(0.0147)
Policy 0.280∗∗∗
(0.0149)
Policy Expiration 0.102∗∗∗
(0.0260)
Emergency Expiration 0.0381∗∗∗
(0.0132)
Constant -1.020∗∗∗
(0.00256)
Observations 4304
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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MIDs and States of Emergency
I argue that strong emergency powers produce militarized interstate disputes because leaders are able
to exercise greater influence over government action during times of emergency. This mechanism requires
that leaders activate these emergency powers, and thus that these countries enact states of emergency, during
these disputes. I find that roughly 30% of states of emergency coincide with militarized interstate disputes,
and MID onset is a strong predictor of a state of emergency.
Table III.6: Bivariate Regression: MID Onset and States of Emergency
(1) (2)
Declared SOE MID Onset
MID Onset 0.221∗∗
(0.106)
Declared SOE 0.229∗∗
(0.109)
Constant -0.945∗∗∗ -0.753∗∗∗
(0.0715) (0.0509)
Observations 4821 4821
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
However, I also find that states of emergency predict MID onset. It is difficult to assert the direction of
the causal order of these events. States may declare a state of emergency in response to MIDs because leaders
seek to access additional powers. But it is also possible that when states declare a state of emergency, they
are vulnerable to outside actors, and thus the probability of a MID increases. Further, the temporal order
will not answer this question, since many states can declare emergencies at the very threat of conflict, and
thus anticipation, rather than the event itself, could be driving action. A Granger Causality test is likewise
inconclusive.
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Table III.7: Granger Causality Test: MIDs and Emergencies
(1) (2)
Declared SOE MID Onset
MID Onset (Lagged) 0.250∗∗
(0.102)
Declared SOE (Lagged) 0.278∗∗∗
(0.108)
Constant -0.957∗∗∗ -0.792∗∗∗
(0.0707) (0.0510)
Observations 4800 4821
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
I answer this question by considering emergency power strength. I interact emergency power strength
with both declared states of emergency and MID onset as predictors of the other outcome. I find that the
interaction between militarized interstate disputes and emergency power strength is in fact a significant pre-
dictor of the probability of declaring a state of emergency. This suggests that when a MID occurs, only states
with strong emergency powers actually declare a state of emergency, which is consistent with my theory. I
find that the interaction between declared states of emergency and emergency power strength is not predictive
of MID onset. This makes intuitive sense, as states should be expected to be less vulnerable during a state of
emergency under strong emergency powers, all else equal. Further, the probability of MID onset is generally
lower for states under a state of emergency than those not in a state of emergency. In sum, this suggests that
the direction of causality does not flow from states of emergency to MID onset in the central analysis in this
chapter, which should alleviate some concerns over the causality of the result.
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Table III.8: Interaction: Declared SOE and MID Onset
(1) (2)
Declared SOE MID Onset
MID Onset -0.0446
(0.117)
Emergency Power Strength 0.113∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗
(0.0555) (0.0430)
MID Onset × Emergency Power Strength 0.224∗∗
(0.107)
Polity Score -0.00762 0.0340
(0.0442) (0.0354)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization 0.436∗∗
(0.198)
Powerless Population (%) 1.430∗∗∗
(0.456)
Past Coups 0.0498∗∗∗
(0.00903)
Inequality 0.0167∗∗∗
(0.00577)
GDP Per Capita -0.0181∗
(0.00965)
Civil War 0.902∗∗ 0.306
(0.354) (0.369)
Number of Spoken Languages -0.0391∗∗∗
(0.00754)
Democracy Years 0.0165 0.00663
(0.0269) (0.0206)
Peace Years -0.251∗∗∗ 0.0857∗
(0.0479) (0.0469)
Declared SOE -0.450∗∗∗
(0.139)
Declared SOE=1 × Emergency Power Strength 0.231∗
(0.129)
Rivalry 0.649∗∗∗
(0.0874)
CINC Score 10.24∗∗∗
(2.958)
Past MIDs 0.00468∗∗∗
(0.000932)
Constant -0.726 -1.463∗∗∗
(0.471) (0.292)
Observations 1604 1927
Peace Year Splines Yes Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Figure III.5: Interaction of SOE Declaration and Emergency Powers
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Figure III.6: Interaction of MID Onset and Emergency Powers
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Table III.9: Emergency Powers, MIDs, and Declared SOEs
(1)
MID Onset
Declared SOE
MID Onset (Lagged) -0.207
(0.134)
Emergency Power Strength 0.0551
(0.0603)
MID Onset (Lagged) × Emergency Power Strength 0.232∗∗
(0.115)
Polity Score -0.0140
(0.0441)
Past MIDs 0.00668∗∗∗
(0.000807)
Rivalry 0.150
(0.106)
Powerless Population (%) 1.635∗∗∗
(0.460)
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization -0.347∗
(0.178)
Past Coups 0.0463∗∗∗
(0.00964)
Inequality 0.0228∗∗∗
(0.00557)
GDP Per Capita -0.0335∗∗∗
(0.00928)
Civil War 0.385
(0.443)
Constant -1.252∗∗∗
(0.463)
Observations 1618
Peace Year Splines Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.10: Bivariate Regression: MID and Emergency Powers
MID War
Emergency Powers 0.129∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗
(0.0226) (0.0528)
Constant -0.796∗∗∗ -2.132∗∗∗
(0.0221) (0.0509)
Observations 4107 3826
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.11: Binary Emergency Powers and MID Onset
(Probit) (Probit)
MID Onset MID Onset
Emergency Power (Binary) 0.119∗ 0.0868
(0.0656) (0.0711)
Rivalry 0.760∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.0681) (0.0752)
Civil War 0.519∗ 0.481∗
(0.265) (0.257)
CINC Score 7.430∗∗∗ 9.408∗∗∗
(2.462) (2.679)
Past MIDs 0.00453∗∗∗ 0.00520∗∗∗
(0.000778) (0.000812)
Polity Score 0.0509∗∗ 0.0573∗∗
(0.0227) (0.0287)
Peace Years 0.0128
(0.0313)
Democracy Years 0.0450∗∗
(0.0176)
Constant -1.724∗∗∗ -1.811∗∗∗
(0.217) (0.260)
Observations 2795 2569
Peace Year Splines No Yes
Democracy Year Splines No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.12: Emergency Powers With Uncertainty Measurements
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.092∗
(0.063)
Rivalry 1.345∗∗∗
(0.125)
Civil War 0.840∗
(0.471)
CINC Score 24.332∗∗∗
(4.384)
Past MIDs 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001)
Polity Score 0.095∗∗
(0.0448)
Constant -2.938∗∗∗
(0.410)
Observations 2308
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
I follow Crabtree and Fariss (2015) in including the measure of uncertainty around the Bayesian estimate
in my baseline regression using 1000 random draws from the distribution of the posterior. The results are
weaker, but still indicative of the same general pattern as before.
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Table III.13: Component Parts and MID Onset I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rivalry 0.764∗∗∗ 0.757∗∗∗ 0.745∗∗∗ 0.770∗∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗ 0.767∗∗∗ 0.800∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.0679) (0.0674) (0.0677) (0.0688) (0.0669) (0.0677)
Civil War 0.505∗ 0.508∗ 0.473∗ 0.473∗ 0.480∗ 0.475∗ 0.503∗
(0.263) (0.264) (0.270) (0.268) (0.260) (0.270) (0.264)
CINC Score 7.586∗∗∗ 7.691∗∗∗ 7.795∗∗∗ 7.006∗∗∗ 7.458∗∗∗ 7.716∗∗∗ 7.958∗∗∗
(2.537) (2.536) (2.412) (2.248) (2.476) (2.361) (2.566)
Previous MIDs 0.00449∗∗∗ 0.00438∗∗∗ 0.00439∗∗∗ 0.00471∗∗∗ 0.00467∗∗∗ 0.00414∗∗∗ 0.00372∗∗∗
(0.000783) (0.000798) (0.000763) (0.000747) (0.000761) (0.000760) (0.000871)
Polity Score 0.0389∗ 0.0413∗ 0.0658∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗ 0.0579∗∗ 0.0474∗∗ 0.0576∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0223) (0.0233) (0.0227) (0.0242) (0.0226) (0.0230)
Policy 0.0861∗∗
(0.0350)
Powers 0.0747∗∗
(0.0321)
Breadth 0.279∗∗∗
(0.0624)
Crisis 0.250∗∗∗
(0.0579)
Exception 0.143∗∗
(0.0711)
Vagueness 0.290∗∗∗
(0.0580)
Retro Checks 0.129∗∗∗
(0.0390)
Constant -1.603∗∗∗ -1.632∗∗∗ -1.940∗∗∗ -1.806∗∗∗ -1.812∗∗∗ -1.743∗∗∗ -1.766∗∗∗
(0.203) (0.205) (0.225) (0.214) (0.240) (0.210) (0.213)
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.14: Component Parts and MID Onset II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rivalry 0.774∗∗∗ 0.788∗∗∗ 0.776∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗ 0.783∗∗∗
(0.0677) (0.0702) (0.0681) (0.0685) (0.0682) (0.0683) (0.0674)
Civil War 0.512∗ 0.505∗ 0.503∗ 0.495∗ 0.503∗ 0.454∗ 0.502∗
(0.263) (0.260) (0.260) (0.259) (0.258) (0.258) (0.260)
CINC Score 7.246∗∗∗ 6.778∗∗∗ 7.049∗∗∗ 7.285∗∗∗ 6.808∗∗∗ 6.116∗∗∗ 6.833∗∗∗
(2.541) (2.393) (2.537) (2.648) (2.418) (2.349) (2.442)
Previous MIDs 0.00469∗∗∗ 0.00482∗∗∗ 0.00479∗∗∗ 0.00473∗∗∗ 0.00483∗∗∗ 0.00510∗∗∗ 0.00483∗∗∗
(0.000781) (0.000741) (0.000757) (0.000772) (0.000749) (0.000732) (0.000808)
Polity Score 0.0420∗ 0.0386∗ 0.0426∗ 0.0429∗ 0.0375∗ 0.0207 0.0404∗
(0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0230) (0.0230)
Declaration 0.0415
(0.0433)
Civil Em. -0.0208
(0.0607)
External Em. 0.0925
(0.101)
Attack 0.138∗
(0.0800)
Policy Expir. -0.0836
(0.0707)
Em. Expiration -0.301∗∗∗
(0.0646)
Prior Checks -0.0000018
(0.0340)
Constant -1.611∗∗∗ -1.537∗∗∗ -1.667∗∗∗ -1.698∗∗∗ -1.522∗∗∗ -1.300∗∗∗ -1.564∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.214) (0.227) (0.212) (0.205) (0.213) (0.213)
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.15: Component Parts and War Onset I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rivalry 0.380∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗
(0.150) (0.151) (0.151) (0.153) (0.149) (0.151) (0.145)
Civil War 0.0746 0.0627 0.00743 0.0326 0.0237 0.0303 0.0766
(0.446) (0.444) (0.457) (0.442) (0.444) (0.455) (0.439)
CINC Score 1.544 1.276 2.597∗ 0.620 2.380 1.577 0.570
(1.497) (1.585) (1.527) (1.593) (1.617) (1.557) (1.527)
Past MIDs 0.00374∗∗∗ 0.00383∗∗∗ 0.00381∗∗∗ 0.00404∗∗∗ 0.00404∗∗∗ 0.00374∗∗∗ 0.00372∗∗∗
(0.000959) (0.000951) (0.000918) (0.000972) (0.000895) (0.000964) (0.00100)
Polity Score 0.180∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.0576) (0.0602) (0.0683) (0.0606) (0.0682) (0.0651) (0.0626)
Policy 0.187∗∗
(0.0850)
Powers 0.133
(0.0818)
Breadth 0.625∗∗∗
(0.175)
Crisis 0.211
(0.145)
Exception 0.549∗∗∗
(0.194)
Vagueness 0.397∗∗
(0.157)
Retro Checks 0.0760
(0.0759)
Constant -4.380∗∗∗ -4.526∗∗∗ -5.387∗∗∗ -4.578∗∗∗ -5.363∗∗∗ -4.734∗∗∗ -4.559∗∗∗
(0.538) (0.571) (0.662) (0.564) (0.675) (0.626) (0.579)
Observations 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795 2795
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.16: Component Parts and War Onset II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rivalry 0.387∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.161) (0.152) (0.149) (0.144) (0.152) (0.142)
Civil War 0.0807 0.0516 0.0627 0.0583 0.0243 0.0577 0.0921
(0.445) (0.433) (0.432) (0.432) (0.442) (0.433) (0.438)
CINC Score 1.285 0.172 0.0914 -0.0466 0.0796 -0.0708 0.482
(1.607) (1.670) (1.456) (1.507) (1.526) (1.620) (1.501)
Past MIDs 0.00388∗∗∗ 0.00420∗∗∗ 0.00413∗∗∗ 0.00420∗∗∗ 0.00441∗∗∗ 0.00421∗∗∗ 0.00385∗∗∗
(0.000971) (0.000952) (0.000956) (0.000953) (0.000953) (0.000994) (0.000945)
Polity Score 0.189∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗
(0.0569) (0.0621) (0.0604) (0.0591) (0.0655) (0.0608) (0.0650)
Declaration 0.154
(0.105)
Civil Em. 0.0678
(0.162)
External Em. 0
(.)
Attack 0.0108
(0.192)
Policy Expir. 0.317∗
(0.167)
Em. Expir. -0.00647
(0.157)
Prior Checks 0.0875
(0.0802)
Constant -4.444∗∗∗ -4.483∗∗∗ -4.468∗∗∗ -4.410∗∗∗ -4.820∗∗∗ -4.394∗∗∗ -4.639∗∗∗
(0.544) (0.590) (0.548) (0.562) (0.617) (0.560) (0.611)
Observations 2795 2795 2554 2795 2795 2795 2795
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.17: MID Initiation Models
(Probit) (Probit)
MID Initiation War Initiation
Emergency Power Strength 0.128∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.0394) (0.0470)
Rivalry 0.841∗∗∗ 0.761∗∗∗
(0.0773) (0.0867)
Civil War 0.507∗∗ 0.455∗
(0.253) (0.240)
CINC Score 4.611∗∗∗ 5.151∗∗∗
(1.327) (1.537)
Past MIDs 0.00388∗∗∗ 0.00405∗∗∗
(0.000673) (0.000738)
Polity Score -0.00556 0.0123
(0.0271) (0.0342)
Peace Years -0.0292
(0.0385)
Democracy Years -0.00125
(0.0212)
Constant -1.791∗∗∗ -1.722∗∗∗
(0.240) (0.283)
Observations 2795 2569
Peace Year Splines No Yes
Democracy Year Splines No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.18: Baseline Models with Region Fixed Effects
(Probit) (Probit)
MID Onset War Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.105∗∗∗ 0.182∗
(0.0365) (0.0958)
Rivalry 0.779∗∗∗ 0.182
(0.0880) (0.172)
Civil War 0.284 -0.120
(0.255) (0.443)
CINC Score 8.173∗∗∗ 2.637∗
(2.689) (1.557)
Past MIDs 0.00416∗∗∗ 0.00321∗∗∗
(0.000864) (0.00118)
Polity Score 0.00103 0.157
(0.0354) (0.101)
Peace Years 0.0708∗∗ 0.0994
(0.0348) (0.0773)
Democracy Years 0.0406∗∗ 0.0544
(0.0183) (0.0670)
Constant -1.304∗∗∗ -4.355∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.949)
Observations 2399 2006
Peace Year Splines Yes Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.19: Baseline Models with Clustered Standard Errors
(Probit) (Probit)
MID Onset War Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.0975∗ 0.1000∗
(0.0516) (0.0570)
Rivalry 0.747∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.133)
Civil War 0.503∗∗ 0.472∗∗
(0.244) (0.223)
CINC Score 7.980∗∗ 10.07∗∗∗
(3.587) (2.528)
Past MIDs 0.00425∗∗∗ 0.00487∗∗∗
(0.00100) (0.000927)
Polity Score 0.0458 0.0634
(0.0394) (0.0522)
Peace Years 0.0202
(0.0462)
Democracy Years 0.0422∗
(0.0228)
Constant -1.617∗∗∗ -1.809∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.385)
Observations 2795 2569
Peace Year Splines No Yes
Democracy Year Splines No Yes
Robust, clustered standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.20: Logit with Year Fixed Effects
(1)
MID Onset
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.195∗∗∗
(0.0689)
Rivalry 0.684∗∗∗
(0.145)
Civil War 0.981∗∗
(0.484)
CINC Score 24.55∗∗∗
(5.189)
Past MIDs 0.0106∗∗∗
(0.00166)
Polity Score 0.0962
(0.0611)
Constant -4.271∗∗∗
(0.859)
Observations 2225
Peace Year Splines Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.21: NATO Robustness Check
(1)
MID Onset
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.0983∗∗∗
(0.0358)
Rivalry 0.632∗∗∗
(0.0749)
Civil War 0.483∗
(0.259)
CINC Score 10.11∗∗∗
(2.827)
Past MIDs 0.00439∗∗∗
(0.000854)
Polity Score 0.0385
(0.0301)
NATO Membership 0.203∗∗∗
(0.0755)
Constant -1.581∗∗∗
(0.260)
Observations 2569
Peace Year Splines Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.22: Major Power Robustness Check
(1)
MID Onset
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.0996∗∗∗
(0.0361)
Rivalry 0.636∗∗∗
(0.0754)
Civil War 0.471∗
(0.259)
CINC Score 10.11∗∗∗
(2.766)
Past MIDs 0.00501∗∗∗
(0.00108)
Major Power -0.0392
(0.184)
Polity Score 0.0632∗∗
(0.0285)
Constant -1.811∗∗∗
(0.247)
Observations 2569
Peace Year Splines Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.23: System Type Robustness Check
(1)
MID Onset
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.109∗∗∗
(0.0362)
Rivalry 0.678∗∗∗
(0.0821)
Civil War 0.335
(0.253)
CINC Score 9.493∗∗∗
(2.411)
Past MIDs 0.00423∗∗∗
(0.000785)
Polity Score 0.0126
(0.0305)
Presidential System -0.144
(0.106)
Parliamentary System 0.320∗∗∗
(0.0858)
Constant -1.539∗∗∗
(0.270)
Observations 2492
Peace Year Splines Yes
Democracy Year Splines Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.24: Instrumental Variable Analysis: MID Onset
(1) (2)
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.379∗∗ 0.389∗∗
(0.165) (0.189)
Civil War 0.491∗ 0.463∗
(0.275) (0.269)
CINC Score 10.80∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗∗
(2.989) (3.128)
Polity Score 0.0901∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0510)
Rivalry 0.575∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.149)
Past MIDs 0.00194 0.00275
(0.00159) (0.00175)
Constant -1.903∗∗∗ -2.206∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.357)
Emergency Power Strength
Log Constitutional Word Count 2.736∗∗∗ 3.172∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.404)
Log Constitutional Word Count (Squared) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0205)
Constant -13.38∗∗∗ -14.99∗∗∗
(1.966) (1.975)
Observations 2384 2174
Temporal Dependence Polynomials No Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.25: Instrumental Variable Analysis: War Onset
(1) (2) (3)
Emergency Power Strength 0.187∗∗ 0.174∗ 0.379∗∗
(0.0809) (0.0946) (0.165)
Rivalry 0.367∗∗ 0.231 0.575∗∗∗
(0.152) (0.160) (0.138)
Civil War 0.0592 -0.0344 0.491∗
(0.453) (0.423) (0.275)
CINC Score 2.049 2.625∗ 10.80∗∗∗
(1.578) (1.584) (2.989)
Past MIDs 0.00360∗∗∗ 0.00376∗∗∗ 0.00194
(0.000952) (0.00117) (0.00159)
Polity Score 0.201∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗
(0.0615) (0.0804) (0.0374)
Peace Years 0.00310
(0.0709)
Democracy Years 0.0402
(0.0553)
Constant -4.486∗∗∗ -4.735∗∗∗ -1.903∗∗∗
(0.566) (0.642) (0.276)
Emergency Power Strength
Civil War -0.0251
(0.146)
CINC Score -8.798∗∗∗
(0.861)
Polity Score -0.164∗∗∗
(0.0121)
Rivalry 0.520∗∗∗
(0.0388)
Past MIDs 0.00694∗∗∗
(0.000344)
Log Constitutional Word Count 2.736∗∗∗
(0.401)
Log Constitutional Word Count (Squared) -0.127∗∗∗
(0.0204)
Constant -13.38∗∗∗
(1.966)
Observations 2795 2569 2384
Peace Year Splines No Yes No
Democracy Year Splines No Yes No
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.26: MLE Factor Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MID Onset MID Onset MID Onset MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.0728∗∗ 0.152∗ 0.0706∗∗ 0.163∗
(0.0296) (0.0814) (0.0332) (0.0888)
Rivalry 0.766∗∗∗ 0.674∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.610∗∗∗
(0.0673) (0.127) (0.0740) (0.138)
Civil War 0.509∗ 0.0452 0.478∗ -0.0383
(0.264) (0.259) (0.256) (0.265)
CINC Score 7.538∗∗∗ -6.353 9.606∗∗∗ -5.205
(2.503) (4.307) (2.712) (4.656)
Past MIDs 0.00446∗∗∗ -0.00802∗∗∗ 0.00509∗∗∗ -0.00532
(0.000780) (0.00250) (0.000809) (0.00350)
Polity Score 0.0355 -0.00264 0.0503∗ -0.0111
(0.0223) (0.0499) (0.0277) (0.0566)
Peace Years 0.0161 0.113∗∗
(0.0314) (0.0440)
Democracy Years 0.0449∗∗ 0.0319
(0.0175) (0.0209)
Constant -1.523∗∗∗ 4.071∗∗∗ -1.700∗∗∗ 3.827∗∗
(0.203) (1.341) (0.241) (1.600)
Observations 2795 2497 2569 2338
Peace Year Splines No No Yes Yes
Democracy Year Splines No No Yes Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Figure III.7: Placebo Test: Word Count and Polity
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Table III.27: Placebo Test: Word Count and Polity
(1)
polity2
Log Word Count 0.488
(0.370)
Log Word Count (Squared) -0.0377∗
(0.0193)
Constant 7.699∗∗∗
(1.763)
Observations 4199
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.28: Instrumental Variable: Word Count
(1) (2)
MID Onset MID Onset
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.379∗∗ 0.389∗∗
(0.165) (0.189)
Civil War 0.491∗ 0.463∗
(0.275) (0.269)
CINC Score 10.80∗∗∗ 12.47∗∗∗
(2.989) (3.128)
Polity Score 0.0901∗∗ 0.125∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0510)
Rivalry 0.575∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.149)
Past MIDs 0.00194 0.00275
(0.00159) (0.00175)
Peace Years 0.0402
(0.0361)
Democratic Years 0.0304
(0.0207)
Constant -1.903∗∗∗ -2.206∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.357)
Emergency Power Strength
Civil War -0.0251 -0.0209
(0.146) (0.133)
CINC Score -8.798∗∗∗ -5.819∗∗∗
(0.861) (0.766)
Polity Score -0.164∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0134)
Rivalry 0.520∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
(0.0388) (0.0404)
Past MIDs 0.00694∗∗∗ 0.00628∗∗∗
(0.000344) (0.000321)
Log Word Count 2.736∗∗∗ 3.172∗∗∗
(0.401) (0.404)
Log Word Count (Squared) -0.127∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.0205)
Peace Years -0.0683∗∗∗
(0.0174)
Democracy Years 0.0399∗∗∗
(0.00990)
Constant -13.38∗∗∗ -14.99∗∗∗
(1.966) (1.975)
athrho
Constant -0.261∗ -0.270∗
(0.137) (0.150)
lnsigma
Constant -0.278∗∗∗ -0.326∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0121)
Observations 2384 2174
Peace Year Splines No Yes
Democracy Year Splines No Yes
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.29: Instrumental Variable: Word Count Only
(1)
MID Onset
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.296∗
(0.163)
Civil War 0.493∗
(0.278)
CINC Score 9.809∗∗∗
(2.466)
Polity Score 0.0763∗∗
(0.0375)
Rivalry 0.659∗∗∗
(0.131)
Past MIDs 0.00259∗
(0.00141)
Constant -1.817∗∗∗
(0.287)
Emergency Power Strength
Civil War -0.123
(0.141)
CINC Score -9.845∗∗∗
(0.700)
Polity Score -0.164∗∗∗
(0.0123)
Rivalry 0.525∗∗∗
(0.0394)
Past MIDs 0.00696∗∗∗
(0.000343)
Log Word Count 0.244∗∗∗
(0.0201)
Constant -1.174∗∗∗
(0.248)
athrho
Constant -0.181
(0.133)
lnsigma
Constant -0.270∗∗∗
(0.0109)
Observations 2424
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.30: Instrumental Variable: Word Count with Region Fixed Effects
LPM
MID Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.112∗∗
(0.0569)
Civil War 0.119
(0.0800)
CINC Score 2.686∗∗∗
(0.539)
Polity Score 0.0132
(0.0121)
Rivalry 0.218∗∗∗
(0.0334)
Past MIDs 0.000800∗
(0.000478)
Constant -0.180∗
(0.106)
Observations 2004
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.31: Instrumental Variable: Word Count with Year Fixed Effects
LPM
Mid Onset
Emergency Power Strength 0.0906∗∗
(0.0445)
Civil War 0.195∗∗
(0.0816)
CINC Score 2.901∗∗∗
(0.452)
Polity Score 0.0217∗∗
(0.0102)
Rivalry 0.111∗∗∗
(0.0400)
Past MIDs 0.00139∗∗∗
(0.000319)
Constant -0.301∗∗∗
(0.0893)
Observations 2174
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.32: Instrumental Variable Analysis (No Verbosity Fix): MID Onset
Full Sample 1 Year On 5 Years On 10 Years On 15 Years On
Emergency Powers 0.379∗∗ 0.382∗∗ 0.384∗∗ 0.420∗∗ 0.470∗∗
(0.165) (0.171) (0.178) (0.200) (0.198)
Civil War 0.491∗ 0.592∗ 0.572 0.628 0.627
(0.275) (0.357) (0.364) (0.400) (0.416)
CINC Score 10.80∗∗∗ 10.18∗∗∗ 9.832∗∗∗ 9.704∗∗∗ 9.776∗∗∗
(2.989) (2.895) (2.858) (2.900) (2.802)
Polity Score 0.0901∗∗ 0.0935∗∗ 0.0929∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.139∗∗
(0.0374) (0.0391) (0.0437) (0.0524) (0.0557)
Rivalry 0.575∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗
(0.138) (0.146) (0.153) (0.179) (0.189)
Past MIDs 0.00194 0.00221 0.00231 0.00262 0.00211
(0.00159) (0.00163) (0.00166) (0.00186) (0.00188)
Constant -1.903∗∗∗ -1.938∗∗∗ -1.909∗∗∗ -2.195∗∗∗ -2.345∗∗∗
(0.276) (0.289) (0.331) (0.399) (0.437)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.33: Instrumental Variable Analysis (No Verbosity Fix): War Onset
Full Sample 1 Year On 5 Years On 10 Years On 15 Years On
Emergency Powers 0.761∗∗ 0.769∗∗ 0.976∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.332) (0.210) (0.227) (0.276)
Civil War 0.0794 0.0206 -0.0175 0.0813 0.192
(0.433) (0.462) (0.431) (0.477) (0.521)
CINC Score 8.754∗∗ 8.775∗∗ 11.07∗∗∗ 10.66∗∗∗ 9.670∗∗∗
(4.096) (4.239) (2.840) (3.016) (3.483)
Polity Score 0.291∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗
(0.0604) (0.0596) (0.0528) (0.0559) (0.0716)
Rivalry -0.0210 -0.0734 -0.321 -0.345 -0.258
(0.274) (0.286) (0.196) (0.211) (0.247)
Past MIDs -0.000984 -0.000831 -0.00260 -0.00226 -0.000975
(0.00334) (0.00348) (0.00260) (0.00272) (0.00312)
Constant -4.828∗∗∗ -4.639∗∗∗ -4.383∗∗∗ -4.261∗∗∗ -4.199∗∗∗
(0.642) (0.595) (0.653) (0.604) (0.650)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.34: Instrumental Variable: Irregular Leader Turnover
Full Sample 1 Year On 5 Years On 10 Years On 15 Years On
MID Onset
Emergency Powers 0.278** 0.258* 0.394** 0.639*** 0.646***
(0.125) (0.136) (0.160) (0.163) (0.208)
Civil War 0.813** 0.948** 0.993** 1.284** 6.424***
(0.326) (0.390) (0.474) (0.632) (0.286)
CINC Score 31.89*** 33.99*** 24.66*** 20.54*** 13.56
(4.706) (5.003) (5.903) (7.617) (9.150)
Polity 0.0385 0.0301 0.0772* 0.0688 -0.00786
(0.0324) (0.0350) (0.0421) (0.0487) (0.0588)
Time -0.142 0.244 -3.024*** 0.322 0.644
(0.156) (0.296) (0.984) (1.818) (4.410)
Constant -1.176 -1.462 1.214 -1.885 -1.448
(0.292) (0.360) (0.886) (1.693) (4.256)
Observations 1798 1707 1388 1141 861
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table III.35: Instrumental Variable Analysis over Time- Cubic Splines
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
MID Onset 1 Year On 5 Years On 10 Years On 15 Years On
Emergency Power Strength 0.414∗∗ 0.407∗∗ 0.393∗∗ 0.401∗ 0.489∗∗
(0.162) (0.168) (0.177) (0.208) (0.222)
Civil War 0.495∗ 0.604∗ 0.591∗ 0.642 0.712∗
(0.269) (0.351) (0.355) (0.399) (0.422)
CINC Score 11.14∗∗∗ 10.36∗∗∗ 10.23∗∗∗ 10.05∗∗∗ 10.62∗∗∗
(3.098) (2.995) (3.076) (3.280) (3.352)
Polity Score 0.0966∗∗ 0.100∗∗ 0.0899∗∗ 0.0911∗ 0.0862
(0.0385) (0.0404) (0.0455) (0.0552) (0.0596)
Rivalry 0.435∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗ 0.408∗∗
(0.132) (0.138) (0.146) (0.170) (0.195)
Past MIDs 0.00217 0.00258 0.00251 0.00304 0.00245
(0.00158) (0.00161) (0.00166) (0.00191) (0.00205)
Peace Years 0.0285 0.0304 0.0347 0.0391 0.0723∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0221) (0.0236) (0.0279) (0.0335)
Spline 1 -0.733∗∗ -0.808∗∗∗ -0.925∗∗∗ -0.892∗∗ -1.156∗∗∗
(0.298) (0.306) (0.325) (0.373) (0.441)
Spline 2 1.520∗∗∗ 1.686∗∗∗ 1.936∗∗∗ 1.845∗∗∗ 2.283∗∗∗
(0.567) (0.581) (0.619) (0.703) (0.827)
Spline 3 -1.176∗∗∗ -1.326∗∗∗ -1.534∗∗∗ -1.434∗∗∗ -1.631∗∗∗
(0.382) (0.392) (0.417) (0.465) (0.539)
Constant -1.848∗∗∗ -1.871∗∗∗ -1.744∗∗∗ -1.906∗∗∗ -2.050∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.334) (0.384) (0.478) (0.517)
Emergency Power Strength
Civil War -0.0588 0.0611 0.0550 0.127 0.0310
(0.150) (0.173) (0.182) (0.227) (0.219)
CINC Score -7.804∗∗∗ -7.611∗∗∗ -7.374∗∗∗ -6.997∗∗∗ -6.518∗∗∗
(0.830) (0.836) (0.844) (0.827) (0.841)
Polity Score -0.176∗∗∗ -0.182∗∗∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0152) (0.0179) (0.0217)
Rivalry 0.507∗∗∗ 0.521∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.554∗∗∗
(0.0425) (0.0446) (0.0480) (0.0527) (0.0588)
Past MIDs 0.00632∗∗∗ 0.00616∗∗∗ 0.00606∗∗∗ 0.00580∗∗∗ 0.00564∗∗∗
(0.000370) (0.000387) (0.000406) (0.000419) (0.000445)
Peace Years -0.0526∗∗∗ -0.0531∗∗∗ -0.0549∗∗∗ -0.0706∗∗∗ -0.0937∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0113) (0.0120) (0.0131) (0.0147)
Spline 1 0.660∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.664∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 1.101∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.153) (0.162) (0.177) (0.198)
Spline 2 -1.220∗∗∗ -1.208∗∗∗ -1.227∗∗∗ -1.457∗∗∗ -2.031∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.288) (0.304) (0.332) (0.370)
Spline 3 0.779∗∗∗ 0.765∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.920∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗
(0.184) (0.189) (0.199) (0.216) (0.237)
Log Word Count 3.274∗∗∗ 3.371∗∗∗ 3.508∗∗∗ 4.015∗∗∗ 4.383∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.489) (0.560) (0.652) (0.785)
Log Word Count (Squared) -0.154∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0248) (0.0283) (0.0330) (0.0396)
Constant -15.76∗∗∗ -16.16∗∗∗ -16.73∗∗∗ -18.95∗∗∗ -20.75∗∗∗
(2.184) (2.397) (2.748) (3.202) (3.871)
Observations 2174 2030 1756 1509 1238
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table III.36: Major Response (ICB) Variable
(1) (2)
Major Response Major Response
Emergency Power Strength 0.324∗∗ 0.717∗∗
(0.126) (0.290)
Past MIDs 0.00219 0.00515
(0.00236) (0.00474)
Polity Score 0.211∗ 0.116
(0.121) (0.272)
Rivalry 0.177 1.044
(0.374) (0.655)
CINC Score -8.483∗∗∗ -9.165∗
(2.368) (5.370)
US Involvement Level 0.251∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.0592) (0.0569)
Soviet Involvement Level 0.0332 0.0594
(0.0512) (0.0584)
Constant 2.823∗∗ 3.284
(1.120) (3.960)
Observations 286 286
Country Fixed Effects No Yes
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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CHAPTER IV
Executive Constraints, Emergency Powers, and Terrorist Attacks in Democratic States
IV.1 Introduction
Scholars contend that the relationship between democracy and terrorism depends on the level of institutional-
ized democracy within the state. Primarily, these authors argue that the level of institutional constraint facing
the executive is the determining factor for whether democracy inhibits or promotes terrorist violence. While
some argue that democratic constraints provide a permissive environment for terrorists to achieve their goals
[Crenshaw, 1981; Li, 2005], others counter that executives free from institutional constraints will be prone
to take overly repressive actions that are counterproductive in preventing future terrorist violence [Abrahms,
2007; Findley and Young, 2011; Daxecker, 2015]. While these scholars provide substantial evidence of the
negative effects of repression in combatting terror, they provide little explanation as to why the unconstrained
democratic leader will prefer to take this overly repressive action in fighting terror.
I extend recent work on executive constraints and terror in formal theory [Dragu and Polborn, 2014]
to argue that while institutional executive constraints are indeed fundamental to the relationship between
democracy and terror, whether an executive free from institutional constraints takes actions that prevent
or incur further terror depends on how public opinion creates electoral incentives for the leader. Drawing
on experimental work regarding the public response to terrorism [Kam and Kinder, 2007; D’Orazio and
Salehyan, ], I argue that the public’s desired response to terrorist acts depends on whether the terror attack
comes from a member of the in-group or the out-group. While citizens seek increased security that pushes
unconstrained leaders to take overly harsh and counterproductive actions against out-group violence, this
push does not exist for terrorists who are drawn from the in-group. This dynamic changes an institutionally
unconstrained leader’s incentives depending on the nature of the terrorist or group, prompting the leader to
take overly repressive counter-terror measures that lead to further violence only when the state faces terror
from an out-group, while allowing the leader to deploy a more measured response to prevent future terror
attacks from the in-group.
I test this argument empirically, using the nation of origin of the attacker to proxy for their social identity.
Further, while in previous studies scholars were constrained to look at institutional limitations on executive
power that either change very infrequently or are completely static, I exploit my data set on emergency power
strength and data on declared states of emergency [Hafner-Burton et al., 2011] to capture additional within-
country variation in executive constraints in democracies. I find that when states with strong emergency
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powers experience a state of emergency, the reduction in executive constraints has the predicted effects for
transnational and domestic terrorism. The institutionally unconstrained executive successfully reduces the
likelihood of a future domestic terror attack in a small but pronounced manner. However, their actions lead
to a substantially higher probability of a future transnational terror event.
IV.2 Democracy, Institutional Constraints, and Terror
A vast literature discuses the role of institutional constraints on the executive in influencing the level of
terrorist violence within the democratic state. Some scholars suggest that because institutional checks on the
executive weaken the ability of the government to fight terrorist groups, they therefore increase the likelihood
of terrorist violence. Democracies are based in fundamental civil liberties. Institutional checks intended to
ensure the sanctity of these civil liberties, arising from the opposition, interest groups, and the other branches
of government, lead to persistent oversight over the democratically elected executive [Li, 2005]. When
leaders are accountable to a broader range of interests, it can be difficult to enact strict policies that might
be necessary to secure the safety of the state when every action can be scrutinized by the public and stricter
security policies that are difficult to apply selectively may infringe on the rights of all individuals in the state.
In a democratic system, where these individuals have a voice in the composition of government and alternative
representatives to choose from, strict policies are costly for government officials who wish to remain in office.
Protecting the rights of the citizens inhibits the actions that the security forces of the state can take in response
to potential terrorist action, and therefore terrorists can organize relatively free from government oversight
[Crenshaw, 1981]. More constrained governments may take a softer stance against terrorist action to avoid
collateral harm to their potential voting base, thereby allowing terrorist groups to build strength within the
nation.
Additionally, strong institutions within democracies may foster an environment where terrorism is the
only option. When there are a number of players within the government who can constrain executive action
and influence policy, it can result in chronic deadlock within the government. This deadlock reduces the
probability that groups can successfully alter policy through institutional means, as any number of veto play-
ers can terminate progress. When this institutional deadlock recurs repeatedly over time, frustration with the
institutional order can cause a lack of confidence in the government. In response, marginalized groups may
use terror to force government decisiveness [Young and Dugan, 2011]. A strong, unencumbered figure at the
center of the government may thus be able to both reduce the likelihood of terrorist violence and respond to
terrorism when it occurs.
Opposing these points, scholars have predominantly argued that executive constraints are a positive force
in reducing terrorism. Since democratic states constrain their executives to respect civil liberties, this limits
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the likelihood of a response that is overly repressive [Abrahms, 2007]. Overly repressive responses have a
threefold influence in perpetuating terrorism. First, extreme responses to terror attacks are likely to increase
grievances outside the immediate terror network. States conducting counter terror operations face a difficult
identification problem [Kalyvas, 2006]. Within the aggrieved group, it is often difficult or impossible to
separate combatant from non-combatant. This lack of information leads governments in search of security to
cast a wide net in the search for terrorists [De Figueiredo and Weingast, 2000]. Negative interactions with the
government’s security forces may inspire those individuals who would have not considered joining a terrorist
group – or their friends and families – to take up arms after experiencing the government’s wrath [Daxecker,
2015]. Increases in the terrorist constituency leads to more durable terrorist groups [Daxecker and Hess,
2013] and may promote large scale attacks if the recruitment is sufficiently strong [Rosendorff and Sandler,
2004].
Second, overly repressive actions worsen this identification problem by making it difficult for the govern-
ment to collect information on terror groups. When states attempt to root out terrorist groups, they depend on
the local population from which the group is drawn to provide information on their movements, capabilities,
recruitment, and plans. Only when the individuals within this population prefer the government to the terror
group will they choose to offer this information. Extreme or indiscriminate reprisals ensure that counter terror
forces will not gather this information [Kalyvas, 2006]. When the government has a range of possible tactics
and they choose indiscriminate violence, this reveals to the marginalized group that the government does not
care about their welfare and is willing to trade it for the security of other groups in the population [Bueno de
Mesquita and Dickson, 2007]. Violations of physical integrity rights are especially damaging, because these
rights are widely shared and belief in human dignity is almost universal [Walsh and Piazza, 2010]. This
type of violence reduces the benefits for cooperation and increases the likelihood that citizens will withhold
information from the government because of resentment and fear.
Lastly, indiscriminately violent responses make it difficult for the state to negotiate peacefully with more
moderate segments of the aggrieved group. Legitimacy is only built when the government respects the rule
of law. When the government engages in arbitrarily violent tactics, it reveals information about the group in
power that can even radicalize moderates [Lake, 2002]. After such tactics, any government claim to negotiate
free from violence will not appear credible. Only when there are external constraints on the executive can
they credibly commit not to abuse the aggrieved group [Findley and Young, 2011]. Groups will not leave
themselves on the mercy of a strong central executive when she has previously shown a lack of restraint, and
moderates may feel that they are safer under protection from the terror group than the government.
This literature further suggests that a leader in a democracy would take repressive action were it not for
the institutional checks that exist to restrain their behavior [Abrahms, 2007]. This suggests that in times of
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crisis, when constraints on the executive are often reduced or removed, as described in chapter 1, leaders
will take overly repressive action that is counterproductive to battling terror. However, these studies do not
examine why a democratic executive would take action that would be overtly counterproductive in battling
terrorist violence [Sa´nchez-Cuenca and De la Calle, 2009]. In the following section, I describe recent work
that suggests that an unconstrained executive might prefer to take overly repressive action because of how
public opinion shapes electoral incentives.
IV.3 The Public and Counterterrorism
In the absence of constraining institutions, we may see a leader in a democracy choose to take overly harsh
actions in rooting out terrorist violence due to the influence of public opinion and the electoral incentives
facing the leader. Dragu and Polborn (2014) demonstrate this using a formal model of executive discretion,
public preferences, and terrorist violence. Consider a situation like in that of a democracy, where there exists
a leader, the public as represented by the median voter, and a community of individuals whose actions can
affect the success of terrorism – those who make up the same population as the aggrieved. The community
chooses to either provide active or passive support for the terrorists or provide information to the authorities
about potential terrorist plans, and the government chooses a level of action to prevent a terror attack that
may or may not repress the civil liberties of the community.
The choice the government makes corresponds to their motivation to be re-elected by the voting public,
with government response depending on the extent to which the public desires increased security from terror.
When the public is especially concerned about terrorist violence and demands greater security, the executive
has a strong electoral incentive to prevent a terror attack. As a result, the government will take all measures
within their control – that is, they will increase their repressive actions – to prevent further terrorist violence
[Dragu and Polborn, 2014, 517]. When the public favors a substantial response, the re-election incentive
pushes the leader to respond in a way that is both highly visible and overtly violent, to demonstrate to the
public that they will protect the nation by any means necessary, since this is the only facet of terrorism
prevention that is directly within their control.
Executive constraints are positive from the perspective of combatting terror. Institutional limits on the
ability of the executive to repress the aggrieved community constrains the expectations of the public to the ac-
tions the executive may legally take. This prevents an electoral incentive in which the executive is compelled
to be too aggressive for their own good. Additionally, this legal constraint provides a credible commitment of
restraint to the community that might otherwise expect repression, increasing their willingness to cooperate
with the government to combat the organization of terror groups. Dragu and Polborn demonstrate that it is
only when the executive faces constraints on their freedom of action that they can overcome the electoral
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incentive and exercise an appropriate level of restraint in preventing terrorist violence.
However, while Dragu and Polborn succinctly root out the motivation for a leader to take overly harsh
action in combatting terrorist violence and demonstrate how executive constraints can forestall this motiva-
tion, there is greater nuance to the relationship between public opinion and the desire for greater security
against terrorist violence. While it is evident that an executive who faces increased electoral incentives to
provide security will often provide too intensive security measures, it is not clear that the public’s response to
terrorism is uniformly a desire for enhanced government action, particularly if this would encroach on their
own civil liberties. Rather, whether the public insists on greater security from the threat depends the nature
of the attack, and especially on the identity of the attacker.
IV.4 Public Opinion and the Composition of Terror Groups
The public’s response to terrorism depends on the respective social identities, such as national, ethnic, and
religious background, of the citizen and the perpetrator. Namely, the way the public views an act of terrorism
depends on whether the perpetrator is a member of the in-group or comes from an out-group. A substantial
literature has discussed the importance of social identity for group decision-making and political phenomena
[Brewer and Brown, 1998; Huddy, 2001]. These studies discuss how social identity leads to preferential
treatment to those who are perceived to be in the same in-group and discrimination of those who are part of
the out-group [Tajfel, 1982]. Additionally, the level of threat the individual feels and their expectation of a
continued future threat depends on whether the threat arises from the in-group or the out-group [Hewstone
et al., 2002]. It is therefore important that the very definition of terror in the public’s perception depends on
the distinction between the in-group and the out-group [D’Orazio and Salehyan, ].
Individuals consistently view negative actions taken by a member of the out-group as systematic and
perceive little variation within the characteristics of the group, instead considering the action to arise from
a fundamental characteristic of the larger group [Linville et al., 1989]. Thus terror attacks by individuals of
a different background provoke a response of out-group hatred and a desire to turn inward and rally-around
one’s own social group in response [Brewer, 1999]. When this othering promotes feelings of anger [Huddy
and Feldman, 2011], reinforces negative stereotypes [Sides and Gross, 2013], and leads to an expectation
of further threats [Huddy et al., 2005], as is likely to be the case in a large-scale terror event, support for
strong national security policies increases. Such social processes in individuals has a proven impact on
support for combatting terror, with individuals who exhibit a greater degree of ethnocentrism more likely to
support military action to hunt terrorists down [Kam and Kinder, 2007] and individuals more likely to support
increased counter-terror measures when the attacker comes from an out-group background that they associate
with violence [D’Orazio and Salehyan, ].
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While terror events that arise from the in-group may also provoke outrage and despair amongst the cit-
izenry, they do not provoke this same sort of group-driven othering. Since the terrorists and the average
citizen are by definition drawn from the same pool of individuals, the average citizen is likely to share a host
of identity-based characteristics with the attacker. To reconcile that a member of their in-group has committed
such an unfathomable act, citizens attribute the terror attack to characteristics that are unique to the individual
rather than to the group, perceiving great variability in characteristics within their in-group when they did not
do the same for the out-group [Linville et al., 1989]. Typically, citizens believe these individuals to be driven
to violence by a psychological disorder rather than political motives or grievances [D’Orazio and Salehyan,
]. The average citizen does not favor harsh reprisals against in-group suspects as a result, believing them to
be more isolated phenomena rather than indicative of a clash of group ideals.
The role of elite discourse further cements these cognitive processes. As recent events show, domestic
terror events are more likely to be politicized. The attack on June 12, 2016, at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando
underscores this difference. Rather than viewed concretely as a terror attack, the shooting was co-opted
into a debate between Democrats and Republicans over gun control [Walsh and LoBianco, 2016]. Since the
resulting public opinion is conditioned by elite behavior to be split along party lines, it minimizes the political
gains that can be achieved by the government taking particularly strong actions against domestic terror groups.
Such events are markedly more likely to become co-opted by a larger political narrative that leads to a more
divisive public reaction. There is often reluctance to even call violence committed by the in-group terror
[D’Orazio and Salehyan, ]. This was evident in the aftermath of the mass shooting at the Emanuel African
Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, on June 17, 2015, where many politicians and
media members alike were reluctant to consider the shooting an act of terror [Groll, 2015]. This further limits
the level of government response that the citizenry considers necessary, since when the public does not view
these violent actions as terrorist acts, it limits their desire to extend the response to include preventing further
violence, instead focusing solely on the capture and incarceration of the individual.
This social dynamic leads to divergent preferences on how to battle terrorists. There is evidence that
individuals favor more aggressive tactics when the terrorist comes from a different nationality, religion, or
ethnic group [Johns and Davies, 2012; Piazza, 2015]. This extends to the lengths the government can go in the
collection of information regarding this terrorist group, particularly regarding tactics used against individuals
that come from the same out-group as the terrorist. The average citizen does not care to oppose harsh tactics
against a population of people that is different from their own group, particularly when those actions take
place away from their own communities. As a result, we should expect that citizens favor an aggressive
response against out-group terror suspects. The same will not be true of in-group terror groups, which will
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be more likely seen as isolated acts of violence, and limit the desire for follow-up action.1
The government in a democracy depends on the support of the citizens to continue their rule. As a result,
when considering a response to terror, the government’s attempts to combat terror groups will reflect the will
of the people. When the public is united in its desire for a strong response to out-group terror, this leads the
government to escalate its response even above levels that will be beneficial in combating future terrorist ac-
tion, inspiring terror through its indiscriminate response. The public’s trepidation and division regarding acts
of in-group terror tempers the leader’s benefits for large-scale attacks, leading to a more measured response
that strikes a balance between enhancing security and avoiding alienation of the target community. This leads
to my central hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: A reduction in executive constraints will lead to overreaction to out-group terror, increasing
the likelihood of future terror events.
Hypothesis 2: A reduction in executive constraints will allow a measured reaction to in-group terror,
decreasing the likelihood of future domestic terror events.
In the following section I describe how I will test the relationship between executive constraint and terror
in a way that captures changes in executive constraint over time within each democratic state to ensure
identification regarding the relationship in question and differentiates between in-group and out-group terror.
IV.5 Research Design
In this section I describe how I test the relationship between executive control and terrorist activity. My
dependent variable is the count of terrorist attacks in each country-year. Annual counts of terrorist attacks
come from the Global Terrorism Database [LaFree and Dugan, 2007]. The data include 70,000 domestic
and international incidents since 1970. Three criteria must be met before an event can be classified as a
terrorist attack – the incident must be intentional, entail some level of violence (including violence against
property) or the threat of violence, and must be perpetrated by subnational actors. Further, the act must meet
two of the following three further criteria: it must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or
social goal, there must be evidence of an intention to convey some message to a larger audience than the
immediate victims, and/or the action must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian
law regarding warfare (LaFree & Dugan 2007, 188).
To proxy for the social identity of the attacker, I distinguish between transnational and domestic terror-
1The capacity of government amplifies how these divergent preferences translate to outcomes. In-group terror suspects are often
domestic, and therefore easier to locate and track. Out-group terror suspects tend to be transnational, and are therefore are more difficult
to combat. The government will often be unable to truly prevent the organization of future violent acts and thus they may have little
to show for their efforts. As a result, they make a great show of their strength in hunting down potential terrorists and sympathizers
regardless of whether these highly visible actions lead to success. Further, security measures against the out-group are less likely to take
place in their own communities or involve sacrifices by the average citizen, increasing the willingness of the citizens to support harsh
counter measures.
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ism.2 Although a substantial portion of the previous work on terrorism has examined only transnational terror,
as more recent work has noted, domestic terror still accounts for the majority of terrorist attacks [Sa´nchez-
Cuenca and De la Calle, 2009; Young and Findley, 2011]. While some scholars have argued that there is no
clear reason to suspect that the location of the attack or the nationality of the victim should be considered
determinants in a causal process [Sa´nchez-Cuenca and De la Calle, 2009], others have argued that the causal
mechanisms for domestic and transnational terror may be different [Enders et al., 2011; Findley and Young,
2011; Hendrix and Young, 2014]. I suggest there is reason to believe that transnational and domestic terror
may inspire different state responses, and lead to different probabilities of future attacks, because the identity
of the perpetrator provokes disparate responses in the public. When the terror is transnational, the perpetrator
is likely to be a member of a religious, ethnic, and/or national out-group in relation to the target population.
Since I argue that there will be different effects for domestic terrorism and international terrorism, I create
two variants of the dependent variable. The first variant includes attacks by individuals and groups against
their home states, domestic terror attacks, while the second includes international terror attacks, attacks by
groups against states that are different than their country of origin or on victims from another country of
origin [Enders et al., 2011].
I then consider variation in executive constraints. When scholars investigate the impact of executive
constraints on the likelihood of terror, one daunting challenge is that the institutional design of the state is
often static or changes infrequently. This means that scholars can leverage only cross-national variation in
executive constraints. Through examining the invocation of emergency powers, I am able to overcome this
common methodological challenge. Emergency provisions are institutional features of democratic states that
expand the purview of state actors during times of international or domestic crises. Emergency powers tilt
the balance of political power towards the executive when there is serious turmoil within the state. Even
narrow emergency provisions grant democratic leaders a number of repressive tools to silence citizens and
transgress their democratically-granted rights. Emergency powers often extend the executive’s control further,
consolidating the entirety of the government’s power in the hands of the executive for the duration of the
crisis. As a result, when a government declares a state of emergency, executive constraints can vary quite
dramatically from their peace time counterparts.
Examining this institutional feature of democracies allows me to make comparisons regarding executive
constraints both within and across countries. Since emergency provisions only come into effect during a
declared state of emergency, and since countries can alter their emergency provisions over time, I am able
to leverage within country variation of the centralization of executive control. Further, since these powers
2Empirically, domestic terror frequently has some international component or connection. For the purposes of this chapter, I separate
terror targeted against the individual’s home country and citizens and that targeted against the territory and citizens of another state.
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differ dramatically across states, I can examine how two otherwise similar states have different terror rates in
regards to the potential strength of the executive.
To operationalize my key independent variable, the exercise of executive power free from constraints,3 I
therefore interact two variables. The first is the declaration of a state of emergency. Data on declared states
of emergency come from a review of the Human Rights Country Reports published by the U.S. Department
of State for each year from 1976 to 2007 [Hafner-Burton et al., 2011]. These emergencies relate to “national
security, terrorism, political unrest, natural disasters, civil wars, and armed conflicts emanating from outside a
state’s borders” (Hafner-Burton, Helfer & Fariss 2011, 688). To ensure that the states of emergency precede
the terrorist attacks and are not instead caused by the terrorist attacks, I lag the declaration of a state of
emergency by one year. The second component of the exercise of executive power is the strength of the
powers granted to the executive during a time of emergency, as developed in chapter 1.
I include a number of controls in each model to avoid a spurious finding. Each of these controls could
be a driver of terrorist activity as well as influencing the strength of the state’s emergency powers or the
likelihood an emergency will occur. I begin by controlling for several international factors. Since the presence
of rival states could drive the adoption of increased emergency powers and rivals may be more likely to
commit terrorist acts against one another [Findley et al., 2012], I control for the presence of an interstate
rivalry [Thompson and Dreyer, 2011]. I also control for the presence of an ongoing interstate war [Sarkees
and Wayman, 2010] since when states engage in international conflict, groups may commit terrorist acts
against their own state or the opposing state, and states experiencing international turmoil are also likely to
be vulnerable to domestic strife and declare a state of emergency.
States with a larger population may be more prone to terrorist grievances and terrorist attacks due to
demographic strain [Drakos and Gofas, 2006], as well as the onset of emergency situations. To account for
this, I control for the log of the state’s population for each year [Singer et al., 1972]. To control for how the
level of development and economic health of the state may lead to terrorist activity as well as the necessity
of a state of emergency, I control for trade as a percentage of the state’s gross domestic product and the log
of the state’s GDP [Gleditsch, 2002]. Further, to control for the level of economic grievance within the state,
since minority group economic discrimination has a relationship with increased terror [Piazza, 2011] and
inequality could lead to domestic turmoil that causes a state of emergency, I control the level of inequality as
determined by the state’s Gini coefficient in a given year [World Bank, 2007].
Lastly, I control for domestic institutions that may jointly influence the probability of a terrorist attack and
3Ideally, I would examine how executives respond to terror events, and how that leads to future terror. With these data I am only able
to examine how variation in executive constraints influences the probability of future terror, because the inciting event for the state of
emergency is uncertain. In this sense, my variable captures the potential for response, which serves as a proxy for the actual response of
the executive. In the appendix, I present results for states of emergency that coincide with a terror attack within the country. The results
are stronger than those I present here.
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the probability a state will declare a state of emergency. I control for each state’s Polity score [Marshall and
Jaggers, 2001], since stronger democratic institutions may guard against the drivers of a state of emergency,
and scholars suggest that democratic institutions may affect the likelihood of terrorist violence in either
direction.4 Since scholars have shown that the number of veto players in the system influences terrorist
activity, and may also influence emergency power strength or invocation, I control for the number of veto
players in a given state, adjusting for electoral rules [Young and Dugan, 2011]. Since scholars have also
shown a relationship between terrorist activity and the competitiveness of the political system [Chenoweth,
2010], which may also influence the likelihood of a declaration of a state of emergency, I control for the
percentage of seats held by the largest party in government [Li, 2005].
The data include all democracies from 1970 to 2007. The unit of analysis is the democracy-year. Since
the dependent variable is a count of the number of terror attacks for each state in each year, I model the
data using a negative binomial regression. There is some concern that these data may be subject to reporting
bias [Drakos and Gofas, 2006]. This bias is likely minimized while examining only democracies, since these
states should have little incentive to under-report the number of terrorist attacks they experience. However, to
ensure the robustness of my results, as a robustness check I use a zero-inflated negative binomial regression,
in which a measure of freedom of the press is used to predict excess zeroes, following the suggestion in the
literature.5 To account for temporal trends and duration dependence I include polynomial temporal controls
for the time since the state last experienced a military conflict and polynomial temporal controls since the
state was last nondemocratic. I calculate all models including robust standard errors.
4In chapter 1, I demonstrate that Polity scores have little association with emergency power strength, indicating that multicollinearity
is not a concern.
5I present this model in the appendix. The results are roughly consistent. However, the model for domestic terror events is imprecisely
estimated.
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IV.6 Results
Table IV.1: States of Emergency and Terrorist Attacks
(1) (2)
Foreign Attacks Domestic Attacks
Declared SOE (Lagged) 0.299 0.610∗∗
(0.288) (0.309)
Emergency Power Strength 0.403∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗
(0.0997) (0.114)
Declared SOE (Lagged) × Emergency Power Strength 0.692∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗
(0.255) (0.242)
Rivalry 1.689∗∗∗ 1.570∗∗∗
(0.226) (0.244)
Ongoing War -0.876∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗
(0.408) (0.408)
Population (Logged) 0.638∗∗∗ 0.979∗∗∗
(0.0760) (0.119)
Real GDP (Logged) 0.791∗∗∗ 1.459∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.205)
Inequality 0.00786 0.0637∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0147)
Trade (%GDP) 0.0219∗∗∗ 0.0149∗∗
(0.00390) (0.00652)
Veto Players 0.128∗∗ 0.0287
(0.0503) (0.0496)
Polity Score -0.0511 -0.00801
(0.144) (0.108)
% Seats Held by Largest Party 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.0131
(0.0108) (0.0119)
Constant -24.00∗∗∗ -30.23∗∗∗
(2.866) (3.588)
Observations 755 755
Duration Splines Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
I present the results in Table IV.1. I first discuss the results for foreign terror attacks. Consistent with
expectations regarding government response to out-group terror, when states that grant strong emergency
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discretion to the executive invoke a state of emergency, they experience a higher number of terror attacks
from foreign groups in the following year. This result is statistically significant at the .01 level. I present a
graphical depiction in Figure IV.1. For states up to and including the mean level of emergency power strength,
there is no difference in the predicted count of terrorist attacks after having declared a state of emergency or in
a world without such a declaration. Above the mean level of emergency power strength, there is a substantial
difference. At the maximum level of emergency power strength, the predicted count of terror attacks is 11
for states that declared a state of emergency in the previous year and just two terror attacks for those that
have not. This suggests that when executives receive unchecked discretion over counter-terror policies, they
respond primarily to electoral incentives. Since the public pushes for a substantial response against foreign
terror groups, the leader has incentives to take such extreme repressive measures that they actually increase
the probability of further terror attacks.
Figure IV.1: Predicted Foreign Attacks
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Turning to the findings for domestic terror attacks, the results are also consistent with expectations about
responses to in-group violence. When states that grant strong emergency discretion to the executive invoke a
state of emergency, they experience a reduction in the number of terror attacks from domestic sources in the
following year. I demonstrate this effect further in Figure IV.2. Although the substantive effect is not as large,
this suggests that there is a distinction between foreign and domestic terror. Domestic terror is deterred by an
increase in the ability of the executive to take unilateral action. Since the government does not face electoral
incentives to over-respond to domestic terror events, they are not prone to the sort of overreaction that makes
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preventing future terror attacks difficult. Instead, leaders provide a measured response that inhibits the ability
for these groups and individuals to operate in the future.
Figure IV.2: Predicted Foreign Attacks
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The controls produce a number of intuitive findings. As expected, states engaged in an ongoing rivalry and
states with larger populations are more likely to experience terrorist attacks from both foreign and domestic
sources. The measures of trade and GDP demonstrate that states that have a better economic health are
more likely to be targets of attacks, perhaps since they have more to lose and are therefore more likely to
compromise. Inequality, a key driver of domestic grievance, is also a strong predictor of the probability of a
domestic terror attack, and does not influence the likelihood of a foreign attack.
The controls also produce a number of surprising findings. While the presence of an ongoing war predicts
the likelihood of domestic terror, perhaps in response to the war or perhaps because the government is weak-
ened or must divide its attention, it decreases the probability of a foreign terror attack. This is particularly
surprising in light of arguments that transnational terror often arises out of spillover conflict [Enders et al.,
2011]. As the number of veto players increases, scholars have suggested that this deadlock will inspire dis-
content in domestic groups, who will turn their frustration about the lack of government progress into violent
outbursts. However, this is not the case here. As the number of veto players increases, the probability of a
domestic terror attack is unchanged. Instead, foreign attacks increase, perhaps because increased veto players
inhibits a government response that is sufficient to prevent future terror. Lastly, as the largest party holds a
greater percentage of seats in the legislature, domestic terror is unchanged, suggesting that inclusion does
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not prevent domestic terror. Instead, the probability of a foreign attack increases, which suggests a unified
party is not constrained by the separation of powers and therefore more likely to respond with excessive force
against terror groups.
The evidence is quite striking. Executive constraints are indeed an important predictor of the likelihood
of future terror attacks against democratic states. However, there are differential effects for transnational and
domestic terror. While an unconstrained executive reduces the probability of future domestic terror, a lack of
constraint increases the probability of transnational terror. This is consistent with a theory that suggests that
the public pushes for a more extreme response to out-group terror that is counterproductive to defeating those
groups. It is further consistent with a theory that this same push is more tempered against in-group terror
due to a decreased expectation of future violence and the politicization of the terror act. Since leaders take
actions against terror groups that respond to electoral incentives, the outcome of their counter-terror tactics is
not always objective progress.
IV.7 Conclusion
Scholars have devoted significant attention to the relationship between democratic institutions within the state
and terrorism. However, institutional constraints provide only one facet of limitations on executive control.
Much of the empirical literature does not incorporate the influence of one of the fundamental cornerstones
of democracy – that leaders respond to electoral incentives. Dragu & Polborn (2014) is the key theoretical
departure. However, there is great nuance to this relationship, since public response to terror is not uniform,
and this chapter engages with this important point.
I argue that leaders make their policy choices regarding the response to terrorist groups not just based
on their institutional constraints, but also on the will of the people. The unconstrained executive may face
incentives to take actions that are overly repressive and counter-productive to counter-terror if the public
demands greater security. However, the actions preferred by the public depend on whether the terror attack
arises from the in-group or an out-group. For out-group or transnational terrorist violence, the public is united
in their demands for increased security, which leads to executive overreaction that weakens counter-terror –
the outcomes scholars expect for an unconstrained executive. However, for in-group or domestic terrorist
violence, there is no such effect. Instead, the unconstrained executive, who is free from both structural
and electoral constraints, can use this freedom to act decisively and better provide for the security of the
nation. Thus, any discussion of executive constraint must also consider how the will of the public provides a
substantial determinant of the actions of the executive.
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IV.8 Appendix
Table IV.2: Terrorist Attacks and Emergency Powers
(1) (2)
Foreign Terrorist Attacks Domestic Terrorist Attacks
Emergency Power Strength 0.595∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.0944) (0.101)
Veto Players 0.143∗∗∗ 0.0640
(0.0509) (0.0531)
Population (Logged) 0.678∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗
(0.0756) (0.116)
Trade (%GDP) 0.0318∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗
(0.00402) (0.00627)
Polity Score -0.00815 -0.102
(0.142) (0.110)
Rivalry 2.044∗∗∗ 1.483∗∗∗
(0.232) (0.241)
% Seats Held by Largest Party 0.0659∗∗∗ 0.000966
(0.00999) (0.0136)
Real GDP (Logged) 1.112∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗
(0.157) (0.201)
Inequality 0.0301∗∗ 0.0637∗∗∗
(0.0121) (0.0157)
Ongoing War -0.688∗ 1.736∗∗∗
(0.364) (0.379)
Peace Years -0.118 -0.456∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.145)
Democracy Years 0.0335 -0.0289
(0.0614) (0.0485)
Constant -29.08∗∗∗ -29.12∗∗∗
(2.665) (3.611)
Observations 797 797
Duration Splines Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table IV.3: Emergency Powers and Terror Attacks: IV Analysis
(1) (2)
Foreign Terrorist Attacks Domestic Terrorist Attacks
Emergency Power Strength 1.005∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗
(0.285) (0.304)
Veto Players -0.0181 0.0335
(0.0676) (0.0668)
Population (Logged) 0.436∗∗∗ 1.153∗∗∗
(0.138) (0.231)
Trade (%GDP) 0.0100∗ 0.00175
(0.00595) (0.00880)
Polity Score -0.0106 -0.350∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.129)
Rivalry 2.373∗∗∗ 1.176∗∗∗
(0.322) (0.340)
% Seats Held by Largest Party 0.0884∗∗∗ -0.00927
(0.0166) (0.0249)
Real GDP (Logged) 0.818∗∗∗ -0.158
(0.219) (0.414)
Inequality -0.0350 0.000530
(0.0217) (0.0313)
Ongoing War -0.399 2.371∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.343)
Constant -20.03∗∗∗ -13.68∗∗∗
(3.591) (4.209)
Observations 668 668
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table IV.4: Terror Attacks and Executive Power (Zero Inflated Binomial)
(1) (2)
Foreign Attacks Domestic Attacks
State of Emergency (Lagged) 0.344 0.553
(0.339) (0.347)
Emergency Power Strength 0.325∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.117)
State of Emergency × Emergency Power Strength 0.815∗∗∗ -0.366
(0.303) (0.258)
Rivalry 1.977∗∗∗ 1.786∗∗∗
(0.259) (0.256)
Ongoing War -1.191∗∗∗ 1.053∗∗
(0.404) (0.433)
Population (Logged) 0.712∗∗∗ 1.152∗∗∗
(0.0823) (0.125)
Trade (%GDP) 0.0244∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗
(0.00442) (0.00657)
Real GDP (Logged) 0.913∗∗∗ 1.631∗∗∗
(0.199) (0.217)
Inequality 0.0205 0.0788∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0156)
Polity Score -0.252∗ -0.0930
(0.151) (0.122)
Veto Players 0.111∗∗ 0.0404
(0.0521) (0.0492)
% Seats Held by Largest Party 0.0776∗∗∗ 0.0150
(0.0119) (0.0130)
Constant -25.80∗∗∗ -34.36∗∗∗
(3.097) (3.728)
Observations 638 638
Duration Splines Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
96
Figure IV.3: Zero Inflated: Predicted Foreign Attacks and Emergency Powers
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Figure IV.4: Zero Inflated: Predicted Domestic Attacks and Emergency Powers
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Figure IV.5: Zero Inflated: Predicted Foreign Attacks
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Figure IV.6: Zero Inflated: Predicted Domestic Attacks
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Pr
ed
ict
ed
 C
ou
nt
 o
f D
om
es
tic
 Te
rro
ris
t A
tta
ck
s
Min Mean Max
Emergency Powers
No SOE SOE
States of Emergency and Terrorism
98
Table IV.5: Terror Attacks and Executive Power (Attack in Previous Year)
(1) (2)
Foreign Attacks Domestic Attacks
Declared SOE (Lagged)=1 0.166 0.515∗
(0.286) (0.310)
Emergency Power Strength 0.467∗∗∗ 0.473∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.122)
Declared SOE (Lagged)=1 × Emergency Power Strength 0.628∗∗ -0.629∗∗
(0.263) (0.246)
Veto Players 0.133∗∗ 0.0499
(0.0544) (0.0527)
Population (Logged) 0.432∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
(0.0854) (0.130)
Trade (%GDP) 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.00977
(0.00426) (0.00683)
Polity Score -0.0675 0.0606
(0.146) (0.108)
Rivalry 1.275∗∗∗ 1.217∗∗∗
(0.235) (0.257)
% Seats Held by Largest Party 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.00152
(0.0110) (0.0132)
Real GDP (Logged) 0.656∗∗∗ 1.296∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.214)
Inequality -0.00988 0.0426∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0157)
Ongoing War -0.773∗∗ 1.840∗∗∗
(0.394) (0.422)
Constant -17.24∗∗∗ -23.50∗∗∗
(3.207) (3.846)
Observations 577 577
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I examine a previously unexplored institution within democratic states – emergency pow-
ers – that has become increasingly important in recent years. I begin with the first empirical study on the
content of emergency powers. I collect information on each emergency provision within democratic states
keying in on their key similarities and differences. I leverage this information by developing a measure of
emergency power strength that can be used in future data analyses and I explore the characteristics of demo-
cratic states that make emergency provision adoption most likely, as well as the determinants of emergency
power strength.
I then consider several ways in which emergency powers may be important for political outcomes that
result in violence. I examine how emergency powers influence bargaining between states over a disputed
issue. I find that emergency power strength is directly related to an increased likelihood of violent conflict
between states, even when I apply the most stringent measures to avoid a spurious finding. The, following the
project’s motivating example, I explore the relationship between declared states of emergency and terrorist
violence. I show how emergency provisions influence the likelihood of future terror attacks, and find that
there are differential effects for domestic and transnational terror.
The potential implications of emergency powers stretch far beyond the work presented here. Scholars of
human rights can examine how executive constraints during times of crisis can lead to human rights abuses.
Scholars of domestic political competition may consider how emergency provisions allow leaders to cir-
cumvent the traditional domestic political bargaining process. Scholars of public opinion can examine how
the legally defined emergency powers reflect or affect the public’s willingness to accept certain government
measures in real world or experimental settings. Scholars of natural disasters can examine how emergency
provisions may dictate the government’s preparedness for or responsiveness to disasters. The possibilities
stretch across many areas of study in political science and encompass a variety of potential methodologies.
This process can additionally provide an impetus for scholars to examine new institutions within demo-
cratic states, following a wave of scholarly attention to variation in institutions within as well as across
regime types [Lindberg et al., 2014]. In particular, this project stresses the role of the constitutions within
democracies as an institution1 and provide a template for scholars to study other aspects of constitutions in
democracies, to understand their impact on conflict decisions, foreign policy, domestic policy, and govern-
ment decision-making more generally.
1To some extent, the examination of democratic constitutions has already begun [Elkins et al., 2009; Eisenstadt et al., 2015].
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